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Introduction
On I July 2004 the area of highly protected ("notake") zones in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Parkincreased five fold to over 25 per cenl of the total
park.
Less that two years earlier Victoria declared a suite of
"no take" marine reserves (national parks and
sanctuaries) which took the amount of sea area to be
highly protected to 5.5 per cent of Victoria's coastal
waters - a 100 fold increase overnight.
But the declaration of highly protected areas does not
automatically mean the protection of these areas. A
combination of increased enforcement (via 20 new
Fisheries Officers in Victoria's case) and community
education programs to encourage voluntary compliance
provides the perceived methods of protecting such areas.
Informing the public of the declaration of a park is an
important step for any newly declared protected area. If
people are aware of a parks existence and the rules within
the park, they are more likely to comply with those rules
and respect persons charged with managing the park
(Kelleher et 01., 1995).
Assuring compliance with regulations is achieved in two
main ways: enforcement and education. It has been found
that education works effectively at increasing compliance
with regulations in a Marine Protected Area (MPA)
(Alcock 1991; Kenchington, 1990). Alder (1996) in a
study on the cost effectiveness of enforcement vs.
education in the Cairns section of the Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park found that education was more cost effective
than enforcement. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
Authority (GBRMPA) realizing the importance of
education, has made it a priority from the time of its
declaration in 1975 (Alcock, 1991; Kenchington, 1990).
In light of these recent substantial increases in highly
protected marine parks, we would like to report on a
study carried out immediately prior to and after the
declaration of Victoria's "no-take" marine protected
areas (MPAs). The outcomes of the study should prove of
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benefit to the recent Great Barrier Reef changes and to
State, Territory and Commonwealth governments
contemplating expanding MPAs.
The StUdy
Victoria's new thirteen Marine National Parks and eleven
Marine Sanctuaries all ban fishing or collecting of any
kind (hence the term "no-take"). The legislation to declare
the reserves was first introduced into parliament in July
2001 but was withdrawn due to the protests of
commercial and recreational fishers (Rollins and Baker,
200 I). Several days before the Victorian state election in
November 2002 the parks were finally declared after 20
years of research and campaigning. To inform the public
of the Parks and Sanctuaries the management agency,
Parks Victoria, developed two promotional activities:
extensive signage near the reserves; and an advertising
campaign in cinemas and on television. The
advertisements were aired from August to December
2002, while the signs appeared around the declaration
date of 16 November 2002 and were erected at each
Marine National Park and Marine Sanctuary and at all
nearby boat ramps.
The aim of the study by Blayney (2003) was to assess the
impact of these two information components on public
perceptions and hence on the potential for voluntary
compliance to park protection. The case study was of four
sites within the Surf Coast Shire, 2 hours south west of
Melbourne. The sites chosen were Pt Addis Marine
National Park, Pt Danger Marine Sanctuary and two
nearby control sites at Pt Roadknight and Urquharts Bluff.
Questionnaire surveys were conducted using face-to-face
interviews on beaches and rocky shores from November
2002 to February 2003. Questions on signage were only
asked at Urquharts Bluff because it was the only place
that signs had been erected by the declaration date.
The survey showed that 53 per cent of respondents (n =
192) did not know that the Marine National Parks and
Sanctuaries were to be declared, or had been recently
declared. Seventy-seven per cent of respondents (n =96)
did not know they were in a Marine National Park,
Sanctuary or in close proximity to one when interviewed.
Seventy-nine per cent of respondents (n = 192) had not
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seen the T.V. commercials for the Marine National Parks
and Sanctuaries. Sixty-one per cent of respondents had
not seen the sign for Marine National Parks at Urquharts
Bluff, while 43 per cent of respondents who had seen the
sign had not read it.
Of respondents who were aware of the existence of the
Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries, 61 per cent of
respondents stated that various forms of media had been
their source of information about Marine National Parks
and Sanctuaries, with television news accounting for 31
per cent of the total, followed by newspapers (24 per
cent). Family and friends were the next most popular
source of information (17 per cent) followed by school or
university (7 per cent).
The proportion of respondents who were aware that a
series of Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries had been
declared on 16 November 2002 was surprisingly low (47
per cent). The number of respondents who knew the
national parks existed may have been inflated in this
study, because many respondents commented that they
became aware of the Marine National Parks and
Sanctuaries through the protests of commercial fishers
who marched on Parliament in 200 I, rather than through
the declaration announcement. This result is similar to
that of a recent study by Goyen and White (2003) on
public awareness of Marine National Parks and
Sanctuaries in Victoria. This was carried out immediately
after declaration at Queenscliff and Hastings (near
recently declared MPAs but not within a MPA). Goyen
and White found that 53 per cent of people were aware of
the Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries.
Discussion
The survey demonstrated that the government's
promotional activities failed to create wide spread
awareness of the Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries,
even amongst those people who actually visited Marine
National Parks and Sanctuaries at Pt Addis and Pt
Danger. Even fewer respondents knew that they were in a
Marine National Park or Sanctuary (23 per cent).
However, this might be due to the lack of signage or the
lack of prominence of the signage at the sites. Porter
(1999) found that 43 per cent of respondents were aware
they were in a marine reserve at Pt Lonsdale (Victoria)
while Williams (1996) in a study on two marine reserves
near Adelaide, found 58 per cent of respondents were
aware they were in an aquatic reserve.
In addition, the study showed that the vast majority of
respondents had not seen the television commercial for
the Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries (79 per cent).
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Further, many of the people interviewed were unsure
about when they had seen the commercials or what was
on them, putting into question whether they had actually
seen the commercials. The lack of awareness of the
commercials is further supported by the small number of
respondents who cited the commercials as their source of
knowledge for the Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries
(\ per cent). This result was similar to that of Goyen and
White (2003) who found that only 7 per cent of
respondents had become aware of the Marine National
Parks and Sanctuaries through the T.V commercials.
These results suggest that the television and cinema
commercials were not an effective means of making
people aware of the Marine National Parks and
Sanctuaries. This is in contrast with the GBRMPA which
has had success with regional advertising campaigns,
although these have been aired intensely over a two-
month period (Alcock, 1991).
The other main mechanism that Parks Victoria used to
create awareness of the Marine National Parks and
Sanctuaries was through signage at the sites and boat
access ramps. Approximately $500 000 was spent on the
signs and boundary markers (J. Mumford pers.comm.).
The signs were placed at all four of the sites in the study
area; the signs at the control sites (non-MPAs) were for
the nearest Marine National Park and were so located
because of the presence of boat access ramps. The first
sign went up in November 2002 at Urquharts Bluff with
the other sites following in December 2002 and January
2003.
Only 39 per cent of the visitors interviewed had seen the
sign at Urquharts Bluff and of those, just over half had
read it. Only 3 per cent of respondents became aware of
the Marine National Parks and Sanctuaries through the
signs. The lack of awareness of the signs may be due to
the number, orientation and nature of the signs. Signs at
Pt Danger, Pt Addis and Pt Roadknight were placed at
access points that were not highly used (Blayney, 2003).
More signs at Pt Danger and Pt Addis would help to
increase users' awareness. Positioning them at the most
used access points would maximise their exposure to
beach users.
Many of those who had seen and read the sign at
Urquharts Bluff were confused as to whether they were in
a Marine National Park or not, as the sign referred to Pt
Addis Marine National Park 3km away by sea. This
suggests that boaters at the site might also be confused,
as the sign was placed there for them.
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Conclusions
In future Parks Victoria, as the management agency, will
need to broaden its communications strategy and use
local media and community groups more effectively.
Such an approach is likely to be more effective in
meeting the conservation objectives of the MPA; in
addition it will be far less expensive than paid television
and cinema advertising. The use of both passive and
active methods to inform the public of the Marine
National Parks and Sanctuaries would be an
improvement. Parks Victoria's methods to publicise the
declaration of the parks were passive, while those used
by the GBRMPA include both passive (e.g. signs) and
active methods (e.g. training tourist operators) resulting
in educated and compliant users.
The key finding of this research was that whilst it is
important to communicate the rights and obligations
surrounding visitors to recently declared, or enhanced
protected sections of, Marine Protected Areas, it is
equally (if not more) important to follow up with locally
targeted communication and education programs specific
to the needs and profiles of the local communities. To
illustrate, in Victoria, Blayney (2003) found the profiles
of visitors to different sites varied significantly; for
example from holiday home owners on regular visits, to
day-visitors on their first visit to the region. One would
expect the management authority to vary its approach in
order to satisfy these different visitor types.
The authors are hopeful that this will occur in both the
Victorian and Great Barrier Reef cases, thus enabling the
protection of the reserves to be enhanced by voluntary
compliance with restrictions rather than more expensive
and negative enforcement procedures.
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NATIVE TITLE RIGHTS AFTER
YORTA YORTA
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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the High Court decisions in Yarmirr, Ward
and Yorta Yorta on the native title rights and interests which can be
established under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), and the evidence that is
required to prove native title rights and interests which will be recognised at
common law. The paper particularly focuses on the notion of a society with a
normative system. The paper also deals with the form of an application for a
determination of native title and the description of native title rights and
interests by reference to activities and extinguishment issues.
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on specific issues raised by the decisions and
arguments which have been and can be put in relation to the High Court's
decisions and the operation of the Native Title ACl1993 (Cth) ('NTA'). The
author draws on experience from native title claims approaching the end of
the trial process following the High Court's decisions in Yarmirr,' Ward'
and Yorla Yorta.' including the Bardi and Jawi claim to the Dampier
Peninsula and sea in the North West Kimberley and the Ngarluma and
Yindjibarndi claim in the Western Pilbara region.'
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame, Freemantle WA, and
Barrister-at-Iaw.
1 Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ,
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan 11, II October 2001)
('Yarmirr').
2 Western Australia vWard [2002] HCA 28 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan 11,8 August 2002) ('Ward').
3 Members of the Yarra Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58
(Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gurnmow, Kirby, Hayne and
Callinan 11,12 December 2002) ('Yorta Yarra').
, The contribution of Carolyn Tan, as Junior Counsel, to the closing submissions
in the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi case is acknowledged; and is reflected in some
parts of this paper.
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The specific issues in relation to which legal arguments will be discussed
will include:
8. The relationship of the normative system of a society to the group who
hold common or group rights under the NTA;
9. The evidence required to prove a normative system which arises prior
to and from the assertion of British sovereignty; .
10. The proof of connection of both a spiritual and physical kind;
II. The right to protect culture by means connected to land and waters;
12. The evidence required to prove a right to control access and make
decisions about access and the notion of partial extinguishment of that
right offshore, in tidal areas, on pastoral leases and in relation to
mining leases;
13. The effect of improvements on pastoral leases and mining leases and
s 44H of the NTA;
14. The concept of reasonable user and coexisting titles;
IS. The vesting of reserves, in particular national parks and nature reserves
in a State (Western Australia) and the operation of the Racial
Discrimination Act ('RDA') (the conclusions of the High Court in
Ward will be critiqued);
16. The effect of the RDA on extinguishment of native title upon the
granting of a mining lease (the conclusions of the High Court in Ward
will be critiqued).
The High Court's recent decisions in Ward, Yannirr and Yorta Yorta
affirm that the principles at common law for establishing native title are
relevant to a determination of native title under the NTA only in so far as
they are not inconsistent with the concepts set out in the NTA, in particular
in ss 223 and 225.
I NORMATIVE SYSTEM
The High Court in Yorta YOrla for the first time linked native title rights
and interests to a normative system. The High Court did not adopt a
narrow Austinian definition of a normative system which requires that
there be an expectation of some retribution for non-observance of a norm.
The High Court in Yorta Yorta suggested a much broader notion of what
might comprise a normative system when their Honours said:
To speak of such rights and interests being possessed under, or rooted in,
traditional law and traditional custom might provoke much jurisprudential
debate about the difference between what H L A Hart referred to as 'merely
convergent habitual behaviour in a social group' and legal rules. The
reference to traditional customs might invite debate about the difference
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between 'moral obligation' and legal rules. A search for parallels between
traditional law and traditional customs on the one hand and Austin's
conception of a system of laws, as a body of commands or general orders
backed by threats which are issued by a sovereign or subordinate in obedience
to the sovereign, mayor may not be fruitful. Likewise, to search in traditional
law and traditional customs for an identified, even an identifiable, rule of
recognition which would distinguish between law on the one hand, and moral
obligation or mere habitual behaviour on the other, mayor may not be
productive....
This last question may, however, be put aside when it is recalled that the
Native Title Act refers to traditional laws acknowledged and traditional
customs observed. Taken as a whole, that expression, with its use of 'and'
rather than 'or', obviates any need to distinguish between what is a matter of
traditional law and what is a matter of traditional custom. Nonetheless,
because the subject of consideration is rights or interests, the rules which
together constitute the traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs.
observed, and under which the rights or interests are said to be possessed,
must be rules having normative content. Without that quality, there may be
observable patterns of behaviour but not rights or interests in relation to land
or waters."
The High Court in Yorta Yorta made the following pronouncements on the
law governing native title:
(1) Origin ofrights and interests
When it is recognised that the subject matter of the inquiry is rights and
interests (in fact rights and interests in relation to land or waters) it is clear
that the laws or customs in which those rights or interests find their origins
must be laws or customs having a normative content and deriving, therefore,
from a body of norms or normative system - the body of norms or normative
system thatexisted before sovereignty'
(2) Pre-sovereignty origin
... the native title rights and interests to which the Native Title Act refers are
rights and interests finding their origin in pre-sovereignty law and custom'
(3) 'Traditional'
... in the context of the Native Title Act, 'traditional' carries with it two other
elements in its meaning. First, it conveys an understanding of the age of the
traditions: the origins of the content of the law or custom concerned are to be
found in the normative rules of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
5 Yorta Yorra [2002] HCA 58, [41], [42] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne II).
'Ibid [38].
'Ibid [45].
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societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown.
H is only those normative rules that are 'traditional' laws and customs.'
(4) Continuing vitality
Secondly, and no less importantly, the reference to rights or interests in land
or waters being possessed under traditional laws acknowledged and
traditional customs observed by the peoples concerned, requires that the
normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed (the
traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a continuous existence
and vitality since sovereignty"
(5) 'Society'
... Law and custom arise out of and, in important respects, go to define a
particular society. In this context, 'society' is to be understood as a body of
persons united in and by its acknowledgment and observance of a body of law
and customs.... 10
(6) Inference from present
... In many cases, perhaps most, claimants will invite the Court to infer, from
evidence led at trial, the content of traditional law and custom at times earlier
than those described in the evidence.... II
(7) Pre-sovereignty normative society
... it is necessary to demonstrate that the normative system out of which the
claimed rights and interests arise is the normative system of the society which
came under a new sovereign order when the British Crown asserted
sovereignty, nota normative system rooted in some other, different, society."
Comparison with Mabo
Those statements are not inconsistent with the views of Justices Brennan
and Toohey in Mabo (No 2), 13 that it is not necessary to prove the 'kind of
society' which existed prior to the assertion of sovereignty in order to find
that there was a society which sustained rights and duties from which
present laws and customs derive. I'
The views of the High Court in Yorta Yorta are also not inconsistent with
views expressed in Mabo (No 2), in relation to the Meriam people, that:
'Ibid [46].
9 Ibid [47].
10 Ibid [49].
II Ibid [80].
12 Ibid [89].
13 Mabo v Queensland(No 2) (1992) 175 CLR I ('Mabo (No 2)').
l'Ibid61,187.
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(I) It is true that the findings of Moynihan J do not allow the articulation of a
precise set of rules and that they are inconclusive as to how consistently a
principle was applied in local law, for example, with respect to inheritance of
land, but... the particular nature of the rules which govern the society or
which describe its members' relationship with land does not determine the
question of traditional land rights. Because rights and duties inter se cannot be
determined precisely, it does not follow that traditional rights are not to be
recognised by the common law"
(g) It is impossible to identify any precise system of title, any precise rules of
inheritance or any precise methods of alienation. Nonetheless, there was
undoubtedly a local system under which the established familial or individual
rights of occupation and use were of a kind which far exceeded the minimum
requirements necessary to found a presumptive common law native title"
II CHANGE
In Yorta Yorta it was said that the laws or customs in which the rights or
interests find their origins must be laws or customs having a normative
content and deriving, therefore, from a body of norms or normative system
that existed before sovereignty.'? The individual laws or customs do not
have to be substantially the same, as long as their origins derive from a
body of norms or normative systems that existed before sovereignty." It is
the normative system that must have continuous existence.I' The key
question as far as any change is concerned, is whether the law or custom
can still be seen to be a traditional law or traditional custom and whether
the change or adaptation is of such a kind that it can no longer be said that
the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws
acknowledged and traditional customs observed by the relevant peoples."
The requirement since sovereignty of continuous (without substantial
interruption) acknowledgment and observance of those laws and customs"
does not mean that the content of law and customs must be the same. What
must continue is observance or acknowledgment of the same normative
system.
Laws and customs are not required to be the same now as they were 'pre-
contact' in order for them to be 'traditional' within the terms of the NTA s
I' Ibid 199 (Toohey J.).
10 Ibid 115(Deane and Gaudron JJ).
17 [2002J HCA 58, [38] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
18 Ibid [46].
I' Ibid [47].
20 Ibid [83].
21 Ibid [87].
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223. Traditional laws and customs may change, evolve or be transformed
without losing their 'traditional' character." The High Court in Yarra
Yarra said:
The rights and interests in land which the new sovereign order recognised
included the rules of traditional law and custom which dealt with the
transmission of those interests. Nor is it to say that account could never be
taken of any alteration to, or development of, that traditional law and custom
that occurred after sovereignty. Account may have to be taken of
developments at least of a kind contemplated by that traditional law and
custom"
The High Court in Yarra Yarra was not suggesting that it is only the 'way
of life' of a society in relation to which change can be tolerated by the
common law, so long as there is no change to any law or custom since
sovereignty. What their Honours said was required is 'an identified body
of laws and customs'" of a normative system of a society which has
continued 'substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty'" in its
acknowledgment and observance. Indeed, their Honours said:
demonstrating some change to, or adaptation of, traditional law or custom or
some interruption of enjoyment or exercise of native title rights or interests in
the period between the Crown asserting sovereignty and the present will not
necessarily be fatal to a native title claim....The key question is whether the
law and custom can still be seen to be traditional law and traditional custom.
Is the change or adaptation of such a kind that it can no longer be said that the
rights or interests asserted are possessed under the traditional laws
acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by the relevant peoples
when that expression is understood in the sense earlier identified?"
Kirby J in Ward referred to 'the capacity of the common law to recognise
change and development in traditional laws and customs'." He preferred
an approach which 'envisages the extension of such recognition to modem
conditions, developed over time, so as to incorporate the use of other
minerals and resources of modem relevance'." He noted that '[s]uch an
approach is generally consistent with the authority of this Court'.29 He
referred to:
22 Yarra Yarra v Victoria (2001) 110FCR 244, [35], [43], [119], [122]-[132J.
23 Yarra Yarra [2002] HCA 58, [44].
24 Ibid [50] (emphasisadded).
25 Ibid [87].
26 Ibid [83].
27 Ward [2002]HCA 28, [574].
" Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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(g) Mabo (No 2), where Brennan J said: 'Of course in time the laws and
customs of any people will change'?" and
[i]t is immaterial that the laws and customs have undergone some change
since the Crown acquired sovereignty provided the general nature of the
connexion between the indigenous people and the land remains."
and where Deane and Gaudron JJ said:
The traditional law and custom is not, however, frozen as at the moment of
establishment of a Colony. Provided any changes do not diminish or
extinguish the relationship between a particular tribe or other group and
particular land, subsequent developments or variations do not extinguish the
title to that land."
(h) Yanner v Eaton, where Gummow J spoke of an 'evolved form of
traditional behaviour'," referring to the use of a mechanical method of
hunting not known before European contact and citing the passages
from Mabo (No 2) referred to above; and
(i) Yarmirr, where Kirby J said 'the principle of non-discrimination must
include recognition that the culture and laws of indigenous peoples
adapt to modem ways of life and evolve in the manner that the cultures
and laws of all societies do', 34 referring to Mabo (No 2)" and Lansman
v Finland.r'
The views expressed by the majority in Yorta Yorta concerning the nature
of the change which the common law will tolerate are not consistent with
any inference of disapproval of Kirby J's view in Ward." The majority of
the High Court in Ward" found that there was no evidence to establish any
traditional law, custom or use relating to petroleum or substances dealt
with by the Mining Act 1904 or the Mining Act 1978. It was not addressing
the question of whether traditional laws or customs might evolve to
embrace use of a substance of modem relevance which might have been
established by the evidence.
The High Court said in Yorta Yorta that:
30(1992) 175CLR 1,61.
" Ibid 70.
"Ibid 110.
JJ (1999) 201 CLR 351, 381-2 [68].
34 (2001) 184 ALR 113, [295]-[296].
"(1992) 175 CLR 1,70, 110, 192.
36 Report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, UN Doc
CCPRlCJ521D151111992 (1994) (Communication No 51111992), para 9.3.
37 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [574].
" Ibid [382].
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account must no doubt be taken of the fact that both pars (a) and (b) of the
definition of native title are cast in the present tense. The questions thus
presented are about present possession of rights or interests and present
connection of claimants with the land or waters. That is not to say, however,
that the continuity of the chain of possession and the continuity of the
connection is irrelevant."
It is the laws and customs and the society that must be continuous since the
assertion of sovereignty, not necessarily the connection of a particular
native title holding group to particular land.
In Yorta Yorta the Court was speaking of 'a body of norms or normative
system"? and 'the normative system under which the rights and interests
are possessed' .'1 The Court was not proscribing the possibility of the
waning and revival of the observance of particular laws within the
operation of a normative system. It is the waning of the system as a whole
to which their Honours directed their attention, when they said:
If that normative system has not existed throughout that period, the rights and
interests which owe their existence to that system will have ceased to exist.
And any later attempt to revive adherence to the tenets of that former system
cannot and will not reconstitute the traditional laws and customs out of which
rights and interests must spring if they are to fall within the definition of
native title."
In relation to the continuity of the system, the Court said:
Nor is it to say that account could never be taken of any alteration to, or
development of, that traditional law and custom that occurred after
sovereignty. Account may have to be taken of developments at least of a kind
contemplated by that traditional law and custom"
That analysis would not preclude the recognition of particular rights which
may have waned and revived in their exercise, which 'find their origin in
pre-sovereignty law and custom'."
In Yorta Yorta it was said that, in the proposition that acknowledgment and
observance of laws and customs must have continued substantially
unintenupted, the qualification 'substantially' is not unimportant." It is a
qualification that must be made to recognise that European settlement has
had the most profound effects on Aboriginal societies and that it is,
39 Yorta Yona [2002] HCA 58, [85].
4<I Ibid [38].
'I Ibid [47].
42 Ibid.
4l Ibid [44].
" Ibid.
" Ibid [89].
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therefore, inevitable that the structures and practices of those societies, and
their members, will have undergone great change since European
settlement. Nonetheless, due to the fact that possession of rights and
interests under traditional laws and customs must be identified, it is
necessary to demonstrate that the normative system out of which the
claimed rights and interests arise is the normative system of the society
which came under a new sovereign order when the British Crown asserted
sovereignty, not a normative system rooted in some other, different
society."
I I I GROUP RIGHTS AND SOCIETY
The High Court in Yorra Yorra said:
Laws and customs do not exist in a vacuum. They are, in Professor Julius
Stone's words, 'socially derivative and non-autonomous'. As Professor
Honore has pointed out, it is axiomatic that 'all laws are laws of a society or
group'. Or as was said earlier, in Paton's Jurisprudence, 'law is but a result of
all the forces that go to make society'. Law and custom arise out of and, in
important respects, go to define a particular society. In this context, 'society'
is to be understood as a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment
andobservanceof a body of law andcustoms."
The High Court in Yorra Yorra explain: 'We choose the word "society"
rather than "community" to emphasise this close relationship between the
identification of the group and the identification of the laws and customs
of that group'."
A group which holds 'common or group rights comprising the native
title'" is not required to also hold social, economic, political or religious
elements which are peculiar to the group. In any event, a group which
holds 'common or group rights comprising the native title' is not required
to also share features such as a high degree of intermarriage, law practices,
rights and interests beyond those relating to land and waters or a tendency
to band together and speak with one voice in the political and social realm.
As a matter of law, a group which holds such 'common or group rights
comprising the native title'''' is not required to (a) be a community which
held title at sovereignty; (b) share cultural links presently and traditionally;
46 In relation to the evolution of traditional laws andcustoms, see also Yorta Yorra
v Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244, [35], [43], [119], [122]-[132].
47 [2002] HCA58, [49].
" Ibid.
.. NTA s 225(a).
so NTA s 225(a).
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or (c) be distinctly associated with the land on account of requirements (a)
and (b); so long as the group possesses the rights under traditional laws
and customs derived from a 'nonnative system that existed before
sovereignty'!' and the society 'has had a continuous existence and vitality
since sovereignty' .":
A Continuing Society
. Laws and customs of a normative society may, among other things,
describe rights and interests in relation to land or waters and describe the
relationships which exist within a society as among its members: both may
have normative content. Those laws and customs which are not directly
relevant to rights and interests in land are relevant in a native title claim to
provide support for drawing an inference as to a society with 'a continuous
existence and vitality since sovereignty'."
B Inference of Continuity
In order for the connection of members of the group of Aboriginal people
to be in accordance with traditional laws and customs, pursuant to s
223(1)(b) of the NTA, it needs only to be a connection based upon laws
and customs which come from a past generation. There is no requirement
to establish knowledge by living persons of a particular depth of
generational connection in order to prove that the connection is in
accordance with traditional laws and customs. The evidence as a whole
must lead to an inference that the laws and customs are those of a
normative system of a society which existed at the time of the assertion of
British sovereignty.
C Particular Group
The connection of particular persons or a particular 'group of persons'"
with particular land or waters does not have to be continuous since the
assertion of British sovereignty if the laws and customs out of which the
connection arises are those of a normative system of a society which has
continued 'substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty'" in its
" Yorra Yorla [2002] HCA 58, [38J.
"Ibid [47J.
" Ibid.
,. NTA s 225(a).
" Yorla Yorla [2002] HCA 58, [87J.
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acknowledgment and observance of 'an identified body of laws and
customs'." Yorta Yorta does not interpret the NTA in such a way that
native title may only exist as a burden on the radical title of the Crown if
an Aboriginal society has maintained continuous connection with its
traditional country since the acquisition of British sovereignty. The High
Court in Yorta Yorta said that the NTA
requires that the normative system under which the rights and interests are
possessed (the traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a
continuous existenceand vitality since sovereignty"
and
that the nonnative system out of which the claimed rights and interests arise is
the normative system of the society which came under a new sovereign order
when the British Crown asserted sovereignty. not a normative system rooted
in some other, different, society.To that end it must be shown that the society,
under whose laws and customs the native title rights and interests are said to
be possessed, has continued to exist throughout that period as a body united
by its acknowledgment and observance of the laws and customs"
If the connection with land and waters is in accordance with traditional
laws and customs then it satisfies the requirements of the Native Title Act
section 223(l)(b).
D Sub-groups
As the High Court said in in Yorta Yorta, a society is that'body of persons
united in and by its acknowledgment of a body of law and custom'" The
society is made up of the broadest group who are so united. Within that
society there may be sub-groups. Such sub-groups will, by definition, also
be united in ihe same way, but that does not make each sub-group a
separate society. Estate groups are an example of a sub-group of the'
society, created and defined by rules of the society to which all members
of the society adhere. An estate group does not create the particular
descent rule by which its membership is defined nor the rules which
allocate rights to its members. It therefore cannot be regarded as a society.
The High Court did not disturb the finding of Lee J and the Full Federal
Court in WA v Ward'" that the Miriuwung and Gajerrong peoples, who
observed a common set of traditional laws and customs, held a communal
56 Ibid [50].
51 Ibid [47] (emphasisadded).
"Ibid [89] (emphasisadded).
" Ibid [49] (emphasis added).
60 (2000) 99 FeR 316, [229].
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native title which accorded rights to sub-groups in relation to lands within
the claim area. There is no inconsistency between that conclusion and the
articulation of the law by the High Court in Yarta Yarla. In Yarta Yarla the
High Court focused on the society which holds in common a set of
normative rules, that is indistinguishable in substance (other than being
more narrowly focused) from the notion of a community (composite or
otherwise) acknowledging and observing a common set of traditional laws
and customs.
The only persons who can hold native title rights and interests are those
who form part of a society with a normative system arising from prior to
the acquisition of British sovereignty which includes laws and customs
which accord such rights and interests to such persons.": An individual (or
group), it seems, cannot acquire native title rights. The normative system
of the society either accords rights or it does not. If it does so, then that is a
feature of the system which must have existed since prior to the acquisition
of British sovereignty, or must be an adaptation of a law or custom which
can still be said to be traditional, in the sense suggested in Yarla Yorta/" It
is therefore doubtful whether anyone can acquire native title rights post-
sovereignty provided they can bring themselves within the normative
system of laws and customs.
E Boundaries of Groups
It is not necessary for the Court to arrive at any conclusion as to the full
extent of the Aboriginal boundaries in determining the native title rights
and interests which exist within the area of land and waters the subject of
the application before it. The Court needs only to determine whether or not
Aboriginal people possess rights and interests under their traditional laws
and customs in relation to the land and waters the subject of the
application." There is no requirement of the type at common law for proof
of precise boundary lines between tribal groups in order to make a
determination of the existence of native title.
F Rights Internal to the System
Nothing in the High Court's decision in Ward or the definition of native
title in s 223 of the NTA detracts from the fact that the nature of a
communal native title or native title rights held by a group of Aboriginal
'I Yorla Yorla [2002] HCA 58, [53J, [54], [56].
"Ibid [46], [47], [83].
61 SeeNTA s 223(1).
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people as against the rest of the world is distinct from the rights which
individual members of the group or sub-groups within the group may have.
When the High Court in Yorta Yorla referred to 'a body of laws and
customs' which is 'productive of existing rights or interests'," this should
be understood in the same sense as in Ward, where their Honours said
'several kinds of rights and interests in relation to land ... exist under
traditional law and custom' .•5 The members of a society as a group may
acknowledge the kinds of rights and interests which exist within the
society. Rights may vest in individuals or groups within the society in
relation to particular portions of the area to which the society is connected
in accordance with traditional law and custom." The exercise or
enforcement of those rights may also fall to the individual in respect of that
particular portion.
The nature of the connection and of the rights and interest may vary
according to the traditional laws and customs upon which they are based.
The rights of an individual may be acknowledged by a native title holding
group in relation to several areas which are determined to be the subject of
native title rights and interests held by a group."
G In Rem Determination and Group Rights
An application may be made, pursuant to s 61 of the NTA, which may not
ultimately be consistent with the terms of determination made pursuant to s
225(a), in relation to the definition of the holders of the common or group
rights comprising a native title. The High Court did not suggest in Ward
that there was any issue between the way the application was framed and
the determination made in that case as to the holders of native title rights
and interests.' Section 61 of the NTA focuses on standing to make the
application and describes a pre-condition of authorisation for an
application to be made, because of the group nature of the rights and
interests. The content of the application does not limit the content of the
determination which the Court makes, pursuant to s 225 of the Act, as an
in rem determination of the persons who hold rights and the rights they
hold in relation to the land and waters the subject of the application.":
.. Yorla Yorla [2002] HCA 58, [50] .
• 5 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [95].
66 SeeNTA s 223(1)(b).
" See NTA s 225.
OR Wik Peoples v Queensland (1994) 49 FCR I; Ward v WA (1998) 159 ALR 483,
552; WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [229]; [2000] FCA 191, [277).
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IV SPIRITUAL CONNECTION
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Tbe connection to land and waters which must be demonstrated is a
connection by the traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal society.6'
The dichotomy of a 'spiritual connection' and 'continuing use or physical
presence' does not assist in the application. The only question is what the
laws and customs indicate about tbe connection of the Aboriginal peoples
to the land and waters. The dissenting views of McHugh and Callinan JJ in
Ward that a spiritual connection will not satisfy s 223(1)(b) read something
into the statutory provision which is not there.
Neither the terms of s 223(1)(b) of the NTA nor the words of the majority
judgment of the High Court in Ward suggest any requirement for evidence
of use or occupation. In fact tbe majority said:
No doubt tbere may be cases wbere tbe way in wbicb land or waters are used
will reveal sometbing about tbe kind of connection tbat exists under
traditional law or custom between Aboriginal peoples and tbe land or waters
concerned. But tbe absence of evidence of some recent use of tbe land or
waters does not, of itself, require tbe conclusion tbat tbere can be no relevant
connection."
The dictum of Toobey J in Mabo (No 2) that 'traditional title is rooted in
physical presence'?' may be of assistance in identifying native title at
common law, but the High Court in Ward indicate that occupation does not
identify rights and interests for the purposes of s 223(1)(a) of the NTA, and
so neitber can 'presence'." Still less does 'presence' comprise a necessary
prerequisite to a finding of 'connection' for the purposes of s 223(1)(b) of
the Act.
The majority judges in tbe High Court in Ward said: 'As is well
recognised, the connection which Aboriginal people have with "country"
is essentially spiritual'." Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pry Ltd"
described 'the aboriginals' relationship to the land' as 'a religious
relationship'. O'Loughlin J in De Rose Hill v South Australia" expressed
the view that 'a spiritual or cultural connection' only may be a connection
in accordance with traditional laws and customs for the purposes of s
223(1)(b) of the NTA. Brennan J said in Mabo (No 2):
6. SeeNTA s 223(1)(b).
70 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [64].
71 (1992) 175 CLR I, 188.
12 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [93].
73 Ibid [14].
74 (1971) 17 FLR 141,167.
7S [2002] FCA 1342, [569] ('De Rose Hill').
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many clans or groups of indigenous people have been physically separated
from their traditional land and have lost their connexion with it. Where a clan
or group has continued to acknowledge the laws and (so far as practicable) to
observe the customs based on the traditions of that clan or group, whereby
their traditional connexion with the land has been substantially maintained,
the traditional community title of that clan or group can be said to remain in
existence" (emphasis added),
At common law loss of "connexion" is a concept that is distinguishable
from physical separation from an area. The majority judges of the Full
Federal Court in Ward said that the 'common law does not provide for the
protection or enforcement of purely religious or spiritual affiliation with
land, divorced from actual physical use and enjoyment of the land'." The
majority judges were there making reference to the circumstance where, as
the High Court held in Fejo v Northern Territory" the 'underlying
existence of traditional laws and customs is a necessary prerequisite for
native title but their existence is not a sufficient basis for recognising
native title' where it has been extinguished. The Full Federal Court in
Ward held that a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of
cultural knowledge is a personal right rather than a right in relation to
land," The High Court in Ward took a similar view, and described a right
of that kind as 'something approaching an incorporeal right akin to a 'new
species of intellectual property'." The High Court also commented therein
that
for example respecting access to sites where artworks on rocks are located or
ceremonies are performed, the traditional laws and customs which are
manifested at these sites answer the requirement of connection with the land
found in par (b) of the definition in s 223(1) of the NTA.'I
SO that the correct analysis is that the common law will take into account a
spiritual connection to land in determining whether the connection is in
accordance with traditional laws and customs. That spiritual connection
may be productive of rights and interests provided there is no grant which
is inconsistent with any continuing native title rights and interests and
provided the spiritual connection is not purely intellectual and can be
related to land or waters.
The application by O'Loughlin J of the view he expressed in De Rose Hill,
however, appears to have miscarried in the conclusion he reached that the
"(1992) 175 CLR I, 59-60.
77 WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [108].
78 (1998) 195 CLR 96, 128.
79 WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [229J.
80 [2002] HCA 28, [59].
'I Ibid.
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'traditional connection' had been lost with the failure to maintain a
physical connection with the area." That conclusion is inconsistent with
the view expressed by the High Court in Ward that 'the absence of
evidence of some recent use of the land or waters does not, of itself,
require the conclusion that there can be no relevant connection' .8J
The High Court in Ward said that where there is not a right of possession,
or a right to control access to land or make binding decisions about the use
to which it is put, then 'it will be preferable to express the rights by
reference to the activities that may be conducted, as of right, on or in
relation to the land or waters'." However, it does not follow from that that
s 225(b) requires the identification of rights which are capable of
articulation in terms of an activity on the land.
The requirements of s 223(1)(b) of the NTA should not be confused with
the evidence required to prove what may amount to rights and interests.
Maintenance of a physical connection to an area is not a common law
requirement of native title. The kind of 'connection' required by the
relevant section does not depend upon a dichotomy between matters
physical and matters spiritual when it comes to describing rights and
interests. There is nothing to suggest that a physical connection only can
exist under traditional laws and customs. The connection requirement may
be satisfied by evidence of a spiritual connection, without having anything
to say about the rights and interests which flow to persons who have such a
connection. The nature of any rights claimed in respect of an area are not
obliged to meet requirements imposed by s 223(1)(b) of the NTA.
It is the traditional law and custom alone that hold the key to the rights and
interests which exist. Those rights may be in the form of rights to physical
presence or use or enjoyment of the area in a variety of ways. Physical
presence may often be the manifestation of the exercise of a right. It is not
the prerequisite to the existence of a right.
While evidence of occupation or use may be relevant to determining
connection, the absence of such evidence is not necessarily determinative
of whether or not native title rights exist."
82 [2002] FCA 1342, [888].
B3[2002] HCA 28, [64].
84 Ibid [52] (emphasis added).
" See Ward [2002] HCA 28, [64].
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V RECENT USE OR OCCUPATION !LApSING OF RIGHTS
The majority said in Ward: 'The fact of occupation, taken by itself, says
nothing of what traditional laws and customs provided'." However, the
absence of evidence of some recent use of the land or waters does not, of
itself, require a conclusion that there can be no relevant connection.
Whether there is a relevant connection depends, in the first instance upon
the content of traditional laws and customs and, in the second, upon what
is meant by 'connection' by those laws and customs."
The High Court in Yarta Yarra said 'some interruption of enjoyment or
exercise of native title rights or interests in the period between the Crown
asserting sovereignty and the present will not necessarily be fatal to a
native title claim';" and further:
Evidence that at some time, since sovereignty. some of those who now assert
that they have that native title have not exercisedthose rights, or evidence that
some of those through whom those now claiming native title rights or
interests contend to be entitled to them have not exercised those rights or
interests, does not inevitably answer therelevant statutory questions."
A 'lapsing' of rights and interests, in order to be established, requires more
than the 'absence of evidence of some recent use of the land or waters' .'0
A Extinguishment
1 Bundle of Rights
As the High Court made clear in WA v Ward: '[I]t is a mistake to assume
that what the NTA refers to as "native title rights and interests": is
necessarily a single set of rights relating to land that is analogous to a fee
simple.''' In Ward the High Court also said that where
in relation to some parts of the claim area, native title rights and interests that
are found to exist do not amount to a right, as against the whole world, to
possession,occupation, use and enjoymentof land or waters, it will seldom be
appropriate, or sufficient, to express the nature of the rights and interests by
using those terms ... Rather, .. , it will be preferable to express the rights by
B6Ibid [93] (Gleeson, GaudronJJ).
87 Ibid [64].
" [2002] HCA 58, [83].
89 Ibid [84].
90 Ibid.
" [2002] HCA 28, [82].
9JCULR NativeTitle Rights after Yarra Yarra 285
reference to the activities that may be conducted, as of right, on or in relation
to the land and waters"
Their Honours added that the
metaphor of 'bundle of rights' ... draws attention to the fact that there may be
more than one right or interest and secondly to the fact that there may be
several kinds of rights and interests in relation to the land that exist under
lraditionallaw and custom."
The High Court has indicated in Ward that native title rights and interests
comprise 'a bundle of rights, the separate components of which may be
extinguished separately'." There may be parts of an area to which a
continuing connection is maintained by native title holders where they are
entitled to 'possession, occupation, use and enjoyment' of the
determination area and other parts where, because of the nature of the
rights possessed under traditional laws and customs and/or the existence of
inconsistent rights which have extinguished one Or more of the original
components of the bundle of rights comprising the native title, other kinds
of native title rights and interests may be determined to exist."
2 Possessory Title
The comprehensive way in which the laws and customs of the society of
Aboriginal people who comprised the Meriam people and the Miriuwung
and Gajerrong people connected them with the area of land and waters the
subject of their claims established a title which is an all-encompassing
interest in the land and waters. Where neither operation of the common
law nor act of the Crown has extinguished a particular native title right or
created a right which is inconsistent with a native title right which affects
the land and waters the subject of this application (or where ss 47A and
47B of the Act operate to make such extinguishment a nullity), a
determination as to a native title which comprises a full beneficial interest
in the land is the appropriate determination. The High Court in Mabo (No
2) considered such an interest as 'possession, occupation, use and
enjoyment' as against the world." That description of the interest is
appropriate in such cases, except where some operative extinguishment is
established. The High Court in Ward described that as a right to
'possession of the land'," The Court said that such an expression would be
92 Ibid [51].
" Ibid [95].
94 Ibid [76].
" Ibid [95].
96 (1992) 175 CLR 1,216.
" [2002] HCA 28, [52].
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'apt to mislead'" where, as it said, 'in relation to some parts of the claim
area, native title rights and interests that are found to exist do not amount
to'·· such a right. What their Honours were referring to were some parts of
the claim area where the right to control access to the area and decide how
the land will be used had been extinguished by inconsistent rights. Where
that right has not been extinguished, the description of the title as a
possessory title will still be appropriate. .
The phrase to 'speak for country', adopted by the High Court in Ward'oo
from a submission put to them by Counsel for the Second Applicants in
that case, was an abbreviated description of evidence presented that there
was a traditional law or custom that certain people within the society had a
right to 'speak for', in the sense of make and communicate decisions about
and/or be asked for and grant permission as to entry onto or access to or
activities upon, areas of the land or waters. As the majority judges
explained, their understanding was that: 'Speaking for country is bound up
with the idea that, at least in some circumstances, others should ask
permission to enter upon country or use it or enjoy its resources' .101 The
right to speak for country amounts to a comprehensive interest in land.
3 Exercise of Exclusive Rights
If Aboriginal traditional law and custom supports an exclusive right, then
an 'effective exercise' of that right is not required to be proved in order for
the right to exist.'?'
B Extinguishment of Right to Control Access
It is arguable that, whereas grants which are inconsistent with an absolute
right to control access completely extinguish that right, grants of other
valid interests such as pastoral leases and statutory rights of regulation do
not..'?'
The majority of the High Court in Ward expressed views that a right in
others to engage in activities or control the use of an area will extinguish a
native title right to exercise the power to 'decide how the land could or
could not be used' .'04 The decision of the High Court is to the effect that
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid [51].
100 Ibid [88].
101 Ibid [14].
102Ibid [64], [88J-[90]; Yorta Yorta [2002] HCA 58, [84].
103See Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1;Eaton v Yanner (1999) 166
ALR258.
104 [2002] HCA28, [219), [192], [309].
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the grant of access or other rights to others will mean that at least some
native title rights to exclusive possession or to control or prevent the
access of others would be permanently extinguished. However, it is
arguable that the ratio of the decision does not require all rights to control
or prevent access to be extinguished nor, if there is only a single right to
control or prevent access rather than a group of rights, does it require that
right to control or prevent access to be completely (as opposed to partially)
extinguished. It is suggested that only the native title rights that are
inconsistent with the grant of other rights or titles should be extinguished
and that where native title rights could still coexist with those other grants,
native title rights continue to exist.
This is based on the principle set out in cases such as Wik Peoples v
Queensland'" and Fejo v Northern Territory''" which was accepted by the
High Court in Ward, to the effect that where pursuant to statute there has
been a grant of rights to third parties, the question which arises is whether
the rights are inconsistent with the alleged native title rights and interests.
Where the rights are inconsistent, there will be extinguishment to the
extent of the inconsistency, and if they are not inconsistent, there will be no
extinguishment. 107
The loss of the absolute right to control and regulate access which is
expressed as a 'right to exclusive possession, occupation, use and
enjoyment' does not necessarily preclude the continuation of such vestiges
of rights to control or regulate access to or presence on an area as are not
inconsistent with rights asserted by or granted by the executive. A general
native title right to make decisions about land, control access to land or
control the use of resources of the land which would be inconsistent with
rights of or emanating from the British sovereign and the successor to the
British sovereign would be extinguished, but more limited rights of that
kind which do not compete with rights of, or emanating from, the Crown
would not have been extinguished.
For example, in the case of a grant of a pastoral lease that does not amount
to a Category A past act, the rights obtained under such a lease are limited.
It is essentially a right to occupy the land for pastoral purposes. It does not,
for instance, confer the right to exclude all others or to carry out non-
pastoral commercial activities (eg to build a factory or to mine, etc). It
would be inconsistent for the native title holders to retain the right to
exclude pastoralists or their staff or licensees from carrying out pastoral
activities in the area, and any such right is extinguished. However, there is
no inconsistency with the native title holders retaining the right to control
10' (1996) 187 CLR 1.
106 (1998) 195 CLR96.
107 [2002] HCA28, [82], [78].
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or prevent the access of other people (eg trespassers or developers) who
are not exercising rights appurtenant to the pastoral lease or any other
interest granted. In this situation, on the principles set out above, the right
or rights to control access of such people would not be extinguished. It is
suggested that any dicta in Ward about the extinguishment of the right to
control access should not be read as indicating that rights to control access
are completely extinguished, but rather, that they are only partially
extinguished or that some rights of control only are extinguished.
The same analysis and principle should apply to the effect of such interests
as mining tenements or the creation of reserves or other non-exclusive
possession acts that are not specifically subject to the non-extinguishment
principle, ie that there is only partial extinguishment of the rights or right
to control or prevent access, and this extinguishment is limited to those
inconsistent rights of control.
In Yarmirr, for example, the High Court upheld the trial judge's
determination that, although a right to possess the sea country claimed as
against non-members of the claimant group had been extinguished in that
case, the right to grant permission to use and enjoy the country as against
non-members of the claimant group had survived. lOS
The High Court said in Ward that once a general right of control of access
has been extinguished by the grant of a pastoral lease that right remains
extinguished.I" Such a general right does not require further
extinguishment upon the termination of a pastoral lease or upon the
subsequent creation of a reserve. However, that does not mean that it
follows that a right which is not inconsistent with any right held under a
pastoral lease is extinguished. Therefore, a right stipulated which
comprises a right to control access of persons other than those who may
enter pursuant' to a pastoral lease is not inconsistent with a pastoral lease
and is not extinguished by the grant of a pastoral lease.
Any generally expressed right to control access would not be affected by
the creation of a reserve following the grant of a pastoral lease, because
that right would already have been extinguished. However, pastoral leases
and reservations each extinguish only such native title rights as are
inconsistent with the rights created by the grant of the pastoral lease and
the reservation. The rights to control access vested by the pastoral lease or
the reservation can only be such as are necessary for giving effect to or
exercising rights pursuant to such purposes. A native title right expressed
so as avoid any conflict or competition with the rights arising from a
108 Yarmirr(2001) 184ALR 113, [86], [83].
109 [2002] HCA 28, [222].
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pastoral lease or a reservation will not be extinguished by the operation of
the common law, as the High Court has expressed it to operate in Ward."°
The partial extinguishment of the right to control access to an area does not
depend upon the identity of the grantee, but upon the rights granted and the
specific inconsistency of such rights with native title rights. The Crown's
title does not expand to 'a larger title to the land' by the grant of a pastoral
lease than is necessary to grant the rights accorded by a pastoral lease. I ":
The grantee of a pastoral lease has a bundle of rights under the grant
including the rights to invite persons onto the lease area (as an incident of
the use for pastoral purposes) and transfer the lease to others (subject to the
statutory limitations on transfer set out in ss l l S and liSA of the Land ACI
1933 (WA).). The exercise of the right to transfer the lease is not a future
act; it is the exercise of a right inherent in the grant. What is transferred is
the same interest which is created by the grant. It is merely held by 1
different person or entity. Section 106(1) of the Act reserves rights frorr
what is granted by a pastoral lease to the Minister. Paragraph (f) reserves 1
right to the Minister to depasture horses, etc, 'together with a right for an)
person to pass over' certain parts of the land 'on all necessary occasions'
The provision indicates what is not included within the grant of a pastora.
lease. It does not confer a right in the public, as against the world, to pass
over the land. It does not determine what native title rights may exist ir
relation to the land. As the High Court concluded in Ward, the reservation:
under a pastoral lease confirm only that a pastoral lease does not grant 1
right to exclude native title holders from the land and the exercise of native
title rights was not unauthorised or unlawful on a pastoral lease.I12
The High Court in Ward, when speaking of rights of access arising undei
mining leases,lJ3 is again addressing the conflict of that right with a genera
native title right to control access and reiterating its conclusion that such 1
right would have previously been extinguished by a grant of a pastora
lease. The Court is not addressing less generally-expressed rights, whicl
do not impact on rights of access arising under grants.
In Yarmirr it was held that there could not be a native title right to 'exclude
from any part of the claimed area all others'!" and that the native titk
right cannot be expressed (as it was by the claimants in that case) a:
'competing' but qualified so that 'such rights may not be exercised so as tc
110 Ibid.
III Ibid [208].
112 Ibid [178]-[1 87].
113 Ibid [309].
11. (2001) 184ALR 113, [94] (emphasis added).
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impair or impede' 115 inconsistent rights. The conclusion of the High Court
in Yarmirr was that a generally-expressed right to exclude cannot exist
subject to a qualification as to the exercise of that right. However, that
does not mean that a native title right which existed prior to sovereignty
may not have been extinguished in part by inconsistency with another right
arising from the new sovereign power, so that the right which remains is a
part, only, of the previously existing right. So long as the right claimed is
to that part of the right which is not inconsistent with the right emanating
from the sovereign, then such right may be recognised by the common
law.
The High Court in Ward, when speaking of the executive (by the act of
designating land as a reserve for a public purpose) taking to itself and
asserting the right to say how the land could be used, is saying nothing
more remarkable than that native title holders could not also have the same
power because it would be inconsistent with the Crown's exercise of that
power. The Court acknowledged that native title holders would have
continuing entitlement to use the land. An entitlement to use the land
necessarily involves continuing decision-making about the use of land,
except that such decision-making cannot be of a kind which is inconsistent
with the decision the Crown has made to dedicate it to a particular public
purpose. 116
C Control of Access to the Seas
The sovereignty of the Crown impinges on any citizen's right to have
absolute control over access to the seas. However, the Crown's powers in
relation to the seas are limited by the common law public rights of fishing
and navigation and the international law right of innocent passage. The
Crown would thus appear not to have a general right to control access to
the seas. The legislature may vest and has vested in the Crown and its
servants and agents powers to regulate behaviour on and within the
territorial seas. It remains open, therefore, for the common law to
recognise native title rights to control access to or behaviour of persons on
the seas which are not inconsistent with the common law rights of fishing
and navigation, the international right of innocent passage and the exercise
by the Crown of statutory powers of regulation of behaviour on the seas.
D Exclusivity and the Inter-tidal Zone
In Ward, what was said was:
lIS Ibid [95] (emphasis added).
116 [2002] HCA 28, [219].
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If the evidence otherwise established that the claimants had, under traditional
law and custom, an exclusive right to fish in tidal waters, that exclusivity has
been extinguished ... As has been explained in the joint reasons in
Commonwealth v farmirr, there is a fundamental inconsistency between a
native title right and interest said to amount to a right to occupy, use and
enjoy waters to the exclusion of all others and public rights of navigation over
and fishing in those waters. Likewise, there is a fundamental inconsistency
between the public right to fish in tidal waters and an exclusive right to fish
thosewaters'"
As can be seen from the dictum, the High Court has made the position
clear as to an exclusive right to fish in tidal waters, but has left open the
position in relation to the exposed foreshore of the inter-tidal zone at low
tide.
The High Court held in Yarmirr, and confirmed in Ward, that a native title
right to 'exclude from any part of the claimed area all others (even those
who exercise [the public rights to navigate and to fish] or the right of
innocent passage)' in relation to tidal waters or the seabed below the low
water mark cannot be recognised by the common law. 118 Equally the native
title right cannot be expressed as 'competing' but qualified so that 'such
rights may not be exercised so as to impair or impede' inconsistent rights
of fishing, navigation and innocent passage."": In other words, a generally
expressed right to exclude cannot exist subject to a qualification as to the
exercise of that right. However, that does not mean that a native title right
which existed prior to sovereignty may not have been extinguished in part
by inconsistency with another right arising from the new sovereign power,
so that the right which remains is a part, only, of the previously existing
right.
The Full Federal Court said in Yarmirr:
The public right to fish and ancillary rights (e.g., bait-digging, the taking of
shell-fish or worms [for bait] for the purpose of exercising the public right to
fish) may be exercised on the foreshore. [However, that does not extend to a
right to take bait from the foreshore for commercial or other purposes] (see
Anderson v Alnwick DC [1993] 3 All ER 613; Adair v National Trust [1998]
NI33)120:
Any native title right which existed prior to the assertion of British
sovereignty which competed with that right, or controlled the exercise of
that right, was extinguished upon the assertion of sovereignty. However,
117 Ibid [388].
118 Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113, [17], [76], [94]; Ward [2002] HCA 28
119 Ibid [95] (emphasis added).
120(1999) 168 ALR 426, [201].
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any right to control access for the purpose of engaging in other activities
was unaffected.
In Blundell v Canerali'" it was held that there is no common law right to
bathe upon the seashore or to pass over it for that purpose. The Court
pointed out in Yarmirr that the property in the seashore, being the space
between the ordinary high and low water mark, is prima facie in the
Crown. Property in the seashore may, however, by grant or prescription be
in the subject.!" The Court also noted that there is no general right to
offload goods or merchandise on the shore, bank or ripa or traverse the
same for the purpose of unlading.!" It follows from the reasoning in that
case that general public rights of access to the seashore do not exist at
common law.
The Court in Fitzharding v Purcell affirmed that:
the bed of the river and the foreshore when covered with water are in fact
parts of the sea, all rights which the public have on the sea attaching to the
foreshore as the tide comes in and covers it... [I]t does not follow that in the
sea below the ebb and flow of the tide the public have rights other than the
rights of fishing and navigation and rights ancillary thereto.12'
According to Halsbury's Laws ofEngland:
The ownership of the foreshore and the bed in tidal waters is determined by
the same rules as the ownership of the seashore is ascertainedand prima facie
the soil of the foreshore and the bed is vested in the Crown on the
presumption that it is the waste of the kingdom which has not been granted"
Such title of the Crown is the radical title which may be burdened by a
native title. 12. Native title may, therefore, exist as a burden on the Crown's
title in relation to the seashore and native title rights and, if the traditional
laws and customs support such rights, may include the same right which
would apply to the holder of a grant or prescriptive right to control access
of persons except those exercising existing common law rights incidental
to the public right to fish or rights of navigation or innocent passage.
The same situation applies in relation to the right of navigation. In Conn v
Free Fishers of Wanstable it was held that:
The bed of navigable rivers where the tide flows and reflows, and of all
estuaries or arms of the sea, is by law vested in the Crown. But this ownership
121 (1821) BB & AId 268, 106ER 1190.
122 CFFC)(J9991 168ALR 426, 13041
"'Ibid [313].
u [1908]2 Ch 139, 166.
u 39 Halsbury's Laws ofEng/and (3'"ed 1952-1964) 509, [664].
126Mabo v Queens/and (No 2) (1992) 175CLR 1,50,52.
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of the Crown is for the benefit of the subject, and cannot be used in aoy
mannerso as to derogate from, or interfere with the right of navigation, which
belongs by law to the subjects of the realm. The right to anchoris a necessary
part of the right of navigation, because it is essential for the full enjoyment of
the right. If the Crown, therefore grantspart of the bed or soil of an estuaryor
navigable river, the grantee takes subject to the public right, and cannot in
respect of his ownership of the soil make any claim or demand, even if it be
expressly granted to him, which in any way interferes with the enjoyment of
the publicright.127
The public right of navigation includes all such things as are incidental to
such navigation, including, for example, the temporary dropping of a
vessel's normal anchor, but does not include the laying of permanent
moorings.!"
Therefore, where under the traditional laws and customs of the native title
holder, the native title holder has a right to control access to the foreshore,
that right was extinguished upon the assertion of British sovereignty as
against a person exercising the public rights which comprise and are
incidental to the right of navigation and the public right to fish. Subject to
that extinguishment, what is not affected in respect of that right by
extinguishment continues.
As the High Court in Ward suggested, the expression of rights in common
law form may often incorporate allusions to or connote consequences
which are not apposite to and 'mask' the true relationship between the
native title rights and interests and other interests in relation to the
determination area.!" The determination can rectify that by paying 'close
attention to the statement of "the relationship" between the native title
rights and interests and the "other interests" relating to the determination
area' .JJO The relationship of rights may be expressed, for example, in
relation to the inter-tidal zone in a manner which reflects the public right to
fish and engage in activities incidental to fishing, while still
acknowledging the traditional law which provides that the exposed inter-
tidal zone is part of an estate and to present times is regarded among the
Aboriginal society of the area as within the authority of those traditionally
affiliated with an estate to give permission to access and take anything
from that area. That right has, since the introduction of the common law
into the area, not existed in relation to members of the public exercising
rights incidental to the public right to fish. The determination can be
expressed in a way that reflects that.
127 (1865) JJ ER 1305, 1312.
128 Fawley Marine v Gafford [1967] 2 All ER 472,477.
129 [2002] HCA 28, [53].
130 Ibid.
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E Confirmation of Access to Seas and Beaches
The oceans and seas are considered the common heritage of humanity in
international law. Consequently, they are not subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of any nation. However, in the interest of public order, safety
and security, a limited jurisdictional regime has been conferred on littoral
states in international law, which includes the territorial seas, the
contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).131
Legislation pursuant to s 212 of the NTA which confirms 'existing public
access to and enjoyment' of waterways, beds, banks and foreshores of
waterways, coastal waters or beaches, confirms only access which is
proved as a matter of fact to exist. There must be evidence in the particular
case to prove such public access or enjoyment.
The public are not prohibited at common law from exercising rights of
fishing and navigation and innocent passage, but do not have any general
right of access in circumstances where the rights of others are contrary to
public access to or enjoyment of an area. In Blundell v Catterall it was
held that there was no 'common law right for the King's subjects to bathe
on the seashore, and to pass over it for that purpose On foot, with horses
and carriages, notwithstanding the part on which the right claimed is, as to
its soil, vested in a particular individual' .132 In Fowley Marine (Emsworth),
Ltd v Gafford133 it was held that there was no common law right to lay or
maintain moorings in another person's land without his permission. In
Lord Fitzhardinge v Purcell'" it was held that the public have no rights
over the foreshore of a tidal navigable river, when it is not covered by the
tide, except as are ancillary to their rights of fishing and navigation in the
sea. The right claimed in that case to go upon the foreshore as a member of
the public, in exercise of a general right of all the King's subjects, to kill
and carry away wild duck was rejected.
F Non-exclusive Resources
A right to receive a portion of resources appropriated by others, if
expressed in such general terms, will necessarily be inconsistent with
exclusive rights to resources which are held by the Crown and grantees of
the Crown or pursuant to the common law. However, a right to receive a
131 See Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc
NCONF.621N22(1982) 21 ILM 1261.
132 (1821) BB & AId 268, 106 ER 1190.
133 [1967] 2 All ER 472, 480.
134 [1908]2 Ch 139.
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portion of resources may manifest in the traditional laws and customs of
Aboriginal peoples within the region and may be legitimate as between
those who do not have inconsistent rights, in relation to particular
resources or otherwise, pursuant to the common law, statute or the
Crown's prerogative.
G Mining and Exclusive Possession
The High Court in Ward emphasise: 'grant of exclusive possession for
mining purposes is directed at preventing others from carrying out mining
and related activities on the relevant land' and that the right to exclude
may be exercised 'in a way which would prevent the exercise of some
relevant native title right or interest for so long as the holder of the mining
lease carries on that activity' (emphasis added) in relation to 'some parts
(even, in some cases, perhaps the whole) of the leased area. That is not to
say, however, that the grant of a mining lease is necessarily inconsistent
with all native title.' I3S The Court is, in that passage, drawing a distinction
between an effect on the exercise of rights for a period of time and the
extinguishment of those rights.
On this basis, there is no reason to suppose that native title rights may not
continue to exist on the area of a mining lease to the full extent established
by the evidence, subject to the right of the holder of a mining lease to
prevent the exercise of native title rights for so long as that is necessary for
the 'meaningful exercise' of the right to use the area for mining purposes.
This would necessarily be inconsistent with a general native title right to
control access to the area.!" Section 44H of the NTA would apply so that
an activity done in accordance with the mining lease would prevail over
any native title rights and interests and any exercise of those rights and
interests, but would not extinguish those rights and interests; the existence
and exercise of the native title rights and interests would not prevent the
doing of the act, either.
1 Residence
Given the analysis of the High Court in Ward, J31 there is no reason to
suppose that a right to camp or build a permanent residence within the area
of a mining lease will necessarily be inconsistent with the grant of a
mining lease. It is a matter of public knowledge that the vast majority of
mining leases are only ever used for exploration. Often only part of the
area of a lease may ever be used for exploratory activity or extraction of
'35 [2002] HCA 28, [308].
136 Ibid [309].
137 Ibid [308].
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minerals and associated activity, and the area occupied for the purposes of
mining operations at anyone time may be a small proportion of the total
lease area.
2 Water
The right of a mining lessee to take water pursuant to s 85(1)(c) of the
Mining Act 1978 (WA) is not an exclusive right to take water. Like the
other rights granted, it is a right to take so much water as may be necessary
for the meaningful exercise of the right to rnine.!"
3 Hunting
The grant of a mining lease is not necessarily inconsistent with or even
necessarily likely to prevent the exercise of the right to hunt. Whether or
not mining operations under a mining lease will eradicate species desired
to be hunted is a matter of fact which may vary according to the nature and
extent of the mining operations taking place in the leased land. The use of
weapons for hunting must. of course. be a use which is consistent with the
general law. ie, a weapon must not be used in circumstances which
infringe the various criminal law provisions as to its use and civil liability
might be attracted in respect of negligent use. However. common
experience in mining areas suggests that there are vast areas of land which
are the subject of mining leases where hunting of all kinds could be
pursued without any risk of violating the criminal law or attracting civil
liability or interfering with mining activity as a result of the use of a
weapon for hunting (whatever the character of the weapon).
H Easement or Licence
An easement or licence is analogous to a reserve or a pastoral lease or
mining lease. in the sense that it is an interest with which native title rights
and interests other than the right to control access may co-exist.!" Co-
existence implies reasonable exercise of the respective rights of the interest
holders."? For example, a right which a native title holder may have to use
the land, in accordance with a traditional custom, may include burning the
dead grass to rejuvenate the land for the next season. If the holder of an
easement in relation to the same land had a right pursuant to that easement
to transport gas along the area of the easement and the manner of
transportation of the gas was such that it might not be in a container which
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid [221], [178]. [415], [296]-[309], [322]-[342]
140 WA v Ward (2000) 99 FeR 316, [342].
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was sufficiently sealed, sunk below ground or otherwise constructed in
such a way as to protect it from fire hazards, including naturally ·occurring
bushfires, (which is most unlikely) then it would seem not to be a
reasonable use of the area for the native title holders to light a fire in the
vicinity of the gas. That does not extinguish the native title right to light a
fire in all other circumstances upon the area of that easement.
1 Public Work
The dedication of a place for 'public work' (as defined in s 253 of the
NTA) creates an easement or a licence in such land and operates to
extinguish native title in relation to the land or waters on which the public
work is constructed, established or situated and adjacent land or waters the
use of which is necessary for, or incidental to, the construction,
establishment or operation of the work (but not necessarily on the whole of
the area of the easement or licencej.!"
2 Improvement
In the case of such co-existing interests, the lawful placement or erection
of improvements on an area the subject of an easement or licence may
prevent the exercise of some native title rights or interests for so long as
the holder of the easement or licence maintains that improvement in situ
for the purpose of exercising rights under the easement or licence.!"
I Non-Exclusive Trade
A right to trade in a resource is a right appurtenant to the right to take the
resource. The right to the resource need not be exclusive in order for it to
be tradable. A right to trade is synonymous with the right of alienation and
embraces the right of native title holders, which may be regulated by
traditional law, the common law or statute law. For example, there is
considerable statutory regulation of fishing, particularly commercial
fishing. The activity of fishing by native title holders who possess a
traditional right to take fish is subject to such regulation.I" The decisions
of the High Court in Yarmirr and Ward do not preclude this
characterisation of the activity of resource trading under traditional law
and custom.
141 NTA s 25!D; Ward [2002] HCA 28, [223].
142 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [308].
143 See Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258.
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VI COEXISTENCE ON PASTORAL LEASES AND REASONABLE USER
Just as other co-existing rights, the co-existence of residency rights with
other rights must be governed by the principle of reasonable user of the
land, identified by the Full Federal Court in Ward.I" In the same way that
a pastoralist may have more than one residence upon a pastoral lease
which does not interfere with the use of the area for the purposes of the
lease, native title holders may do likewise. Circumstances may arise
regarding the appropriate manner of exercise of traditional rights in a way
which will not interfere with the pastoralist's use of the land, which would
be resolved by application of the principle of reasonable user. By way of
example, in the same way that the exercise of the right to hunt may not be
reasonably exercised in chasing kangaroos through the pastoralist's
homestead by discharging firearms, a permanent residence may not, for
example, be reasonably placed in such a location as to cut off the access of
stock to grazing pasture or a water source necessary for their subsistence.
However, the mere existence of the permanent residence of a native title
holder (or numerous native title holders) on a pastoral lease may have no
conceivable impact on the use of thousands of hectares of land for pastoral
purposes.
A right to build a house and live on the land and otherwise occupy the land
will be perfectly consistent and co-exist with rights under a pastoral lease.
However, as a matter of reasonable exercise of the rights, they must not be
exercised in such a manner as to conflict with the pastoralist's rights, and
vice versa. A similar principle applies to the pastoralist. A pastoralist has a
right to build a dam on the pastoral lease. In theory it can be built on any
part of the pastoral lease. The whole pastoral lease could be covered by
dams, leaving no place for a native holder to exercise any rights of hunting
or residence. Such use would not, however, be a reasonable use of the land
for pastoral purposes. A reasonable use would be to build dams in places
of maximum catchment, yielding reasonable quantities of stored water to
sustain stock. Such reasonable use would not be inconsistent with the
exercise of co-existing native title rights.
VII INCONSISTENCY AND SECTION 44H
The High Court in Ward said:
Two rights are inconsistent or they are not. If they are inconsistent, they will
be extinguished to the extent of the inconsistency; if they are not, they will
not be extinguished. Absent particular statutory provisions to the contrary.
144 WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [342].
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suspensions of one set of rights in favour of another do not arise. (emphasis
addedj.!"
Section 44H of the NTA specifically decrees that a requirement for
permission in relation to the doing of an activity and the doing of an
activity in accordance with a lease prevail over native title rights and
interests, 'but do not extinguish them'. If it is not the case that
improvements on leases do not extinguish native title at common law, then
s 44H is a 'particular statutory provision to the contrary' which mandates
the suspension and non-extinguishment of native title rights in relation to
activities comprising improvements pursuant to a lease. (The position in
relation to public works is distinguishable because of the specific
provisions of ss 229(4), 223B(7) and 2510 of the NTA, which apply to
public works.)
A Consistent Right to Burn
Burning, if it was to destroy pasture, would be inconsistent with a
pastoralist's interest. However, the exercise of a right to burn may, in some
terrain, rejuvenate pasture or may be contained to a particular area so as to
have no effect on pasture, and so may continue as a native title right
because it does not create any inconsistency with another's rights.
B Use of Reserves and Inconsistency
The creation and use of a reserve does not determine extinguishment of
native title.I" Use of a reserve, by itself, cannot amount to an effective
assertion of beneficial ownership of a reserve. The High Court in Ward
said that the only effect of designation of land as a reserve for a public
purpose is that it is 'inconsistent with any continued exercise of a power by
native title holders to decide how the land could or could not be used' .147
Their Honours continued: 'The designation of land as a reserve for certain
purposes did not without more, create any right in the public or any section
of the public which, by reason of inconsistency and apart from the State
Validation Act, extinguished native title rights and interests' .148 It is only
when a 'public work' is constructed or established on a reserve, under the
power in the Public Works Act, pursuant to the purpose for which it was
created, that any further extinguishment of native title occurs in relation to
the land or waters on which the public work is constructed, established or
I" Ward [2002] HCA 28, [82].
146 Ibid [215].
147 Ibid [219].
148 Ibid.
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situated and adjacent land or waters the use of which is necessary for, or
incidental to, the construction, establishment or operation of the work.'"
If a reserve is lawfully used in a way which does not entail the
construction of a public work, then the use may prevent the exercise of
some native title rights for so long as the use continues.!"
C Heritage Protection
Olney J in Yarmirr v Northern Territory'" found that a claimed right to
protect places of cultural and spiritual importance was made out. His
Honour said in this regard that, according to the traditional laws and
customs of the community, community members have rights and
obligations in relation to sites within the claimed area, which they are
required to protect from unauthorised and inappropriate use.'" His Honour
determined: '
There are strict and complex rules of access and behaviour at many of these
dangerous sites which, if observed properly, will protect visitors and others
from supernatural danger. It is the duty of the senior yuwurrumu male to
ensure that peopleare awareof these rules and behaviours and, to protectboth
them and others from the dire consequences that can flow from inappropriate
behaviour.P'
A right to protect places of importance, in so far as it suggests a general
right to control access, may be expressed in more specific ternns which do
not result in a conflict with the rights of others.
Protection of a place of importance may occur by means other than those
based upon a right of exclusive possession or control of access to the claim
area. The High Court in Yarmirr reasoned that 'the tension between, on the
one hand, the rights to "occupy, use and enjoy the waters of the
deternnination area to the exclusion of all others" and "to possess" those
waters to the exclusion of all others ... and, on the other, the rights to
fishing navigation and free passage is self-evident' .'" Their Honours note,
however, that 'neither the public right to navigate, nor the right of innocent
passage require free access to each and every part of the territorial sea' .155
'
49 See NTA s 251D. ,
'5<> See Ward [2002] HCA28, [308].
'51 [1998] FCA 771, [162].
152 Ibid [125].
'53 Ibid [124].
,,, Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113, [96].
'55 Ibid.
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The High Court in Ward suggested that where, as in this case, 'according
to traditional law and culture, there is a right to control access to land, or to
make decisions as to its use, but that right is not an exclusive right', then
'it requires close attention to the statement of "the relationship" between
the native title rights and interests and the "other interests" relating to the
determination area' .'56
Giving that close attention to the relationship between the native title right
and other rights, the native title right may thus be more fully described, for
the purposes of a determination in accordance with s 225 of the Act, as:
A right to maintain, conserve and/or protect by all reasonable lawful means
places and objects located within places within the area of cultural and
spiritual social, cultural, religious, spiritual, ceremonial, ritual or
cosmological significance to the common law native title holders, under
traditional laws, customs and practices, from use or activities which are
unauthorised or inappropriate use or activities, in accordance with the
traditional laws and customs of the native title holders, provided that the
native title holders shall have provided all relevant persons by all reasonable
means with information as to such uses, and such persons are able to comply
with the requirements of those traditional laws and customs while engaging in
reasonable use of the area in accordance with the statutory or common law
rights to whichsuch personsmay be entitled.
A right to protect a place may be exercised in a number of ways other than
by controlling access to the place. The protection can be effected in much
the same way that Aboriginal sites are protected under the Aboriginal
Heritage Act 1972 (WA). That Act operates without controlling access to
any place. It puts visitors on notice that to excavate, destroy, damage,
conceal or otherwise alter an Aboriginal site is prohibited.!" A person may
be prosecuted for contravening the prohibition. A register of sites is
maintained which enables the public to be aware of the sites where such
behaviour is prohibited.!" The manner in which the prohibition is most
frequently adhered to is by the preventative measure of any party, who
apprehends that an act may contravene the prohibition, entering into an
agreement with the Aboriginal group with an interest in the matter. This
agreement directs the party's behaviour in a way which leads to avoidance
of the prohibited acts. A similar process is capable of implementation by a
native title holding group. Appropriate public notice could be exhibited in
relation to the existence of sites with indications as to the kind of
behaviour which would breach the right to protect the site. Enforcement of
the right would be effected by resort to available civil law remedies,
158 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [53]. See s 225(d)of the NTA.
'" Section 17. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act
1976 (Cth)also prohibitsdesecration of a place.
rsa Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 (WA)s 38.
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including proceedings for damages or injunctive relief. The approach of
entering into heritage protection agreements (currently common practice)
with mining companies and developers is another way of exercising the
right to protect places of significance to native title holders.
VI I I VESTING OF A RESERVE
A The Land Act
It is arguable that the High Court in Ward. without the benefit of full
argument from the parties on the topic, erroneously interpreted s 33 of the
Land Act (WA) as authorising the passing of a legal estate in fee simple to
any person or body in whom land was 'vested' under that provision.
The High Court indicated in Ward'" that native title rights and interests
would be extinguished to the extent of their inconsistency with rights
under any extinguishing act. The High Court confirmed, however, that
mere reservation of land, such as for a National Park, would not extinguish
native title rights to use the land according to traditional laws and customs
of the native title holders, but a continuing power of native title holders to
decide how the land could or could not be used would be inconsistent with
the executi ve designating the land as a reserve for a public purpose.'''' In
the absence of any earlier acts that extinguished that right, an act would
impinge on native title within the meaning of s 227 of the NTA. If an act
affecting native title was created after 31 October 1975 and before
1 January 1994, it would be a category 0 past act, to which the non-
extinguishment principle applies."!
The point bears repetition that the vesting of control and management in a
person or body does not extinguish all other interests.I"
The majority judgment of the High Court in Ward did not articulate any
reason for inferring that vesting land in a person or body for a purpose by
exercise of a statutory power passed a common law legal estate in fee
", [2002] HCA28. [82].
I'" Ibid [219].
161 Ibid [222].
162 See Thorpe v Grant Pastoral Co (1955) 92 CLR 317, 397 (Fullagar J. WebbJ
concurring), cited with approval in Punterriero v Water Administration
Ministerial Corporation [1999] HCA 45. [9]-[10] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J),
[33]-[36] (McHugh J); S Clark and A Meyers. 'Vesting and Divesting: The
Victorian Underground Water Act 1969' (1969) 7 Melbourne University Law
Review 237.
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simple in that person or body,'63 The reasons for judgment made no
reference to, but might have been influenced by, s 23B(3) of the NTA,
which states:
If:
(a) by or underlegislation of a State or Territory, particular land or waters are
vested in any person; and
(b) a right of exclusive possession of the land or waters is expressly or
impliedly conferred on the person by or under the legislation;
the vesting is taken for the purposes of paragraph (2)(c) to be a vesting of a
freehold estateover the landor waters,
That provision, being a deeming provision, cannot determine the common
law position although it would appear to reflect the common law as the
High Court has concluded it to be, in relation to the interests it was
considering. The statutory provision also depends on the question of law,
that is, whether the right of exclusive possession is conferred by the
relevant legislation or not.
The conclusion that a vesting conferred a legal estate or fee simple title
was reached even though the majority identified that s 33 of the Land Act
1933, as amended by the Land Act Amendment Act 1948, limited the
power of the vestee to lease the land. It is submitted that the provision is
suggestive of something less than an estate in fee simple being held by the
vestee.
The terms of s 33 are considerably expanded, however, by the 1948
amendment, and differ. The amendment provides in s 33(2) that the
Governor may direct that land shall vest in and be held by a person for the
purpose for which it is reserved, and the Governor may confer on the
vestee power to lease for the purpose the whole or part of the land, subject
to such conditions and limitations as the Governor shall deem necessary to
ensure that the land is used for that purpose. The 1933 version of the
section, in addition to declaring that the Governor might direct that the
reserve 'vest in' a municipality, road board, body corporate, or person to
be named in the order, also provided that the Governor direct that the
reserve be 'held... in trust'. The amended form of the section deletes the
reference to the reserve being held in trust. It is contended that the
legislature intended, by the deletion of those words in the amendment, to
provide for a vesting which did not comprise a trust.
163A distinction was drawn between vesting land and placing a reserve under the
control of a board of management under s 34, but thatdistinction does not militate
against any inference as to the nature of the rights accorded by a vesting under s
33.
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Section 33(3) provides an alternative power in the Governor to direct the
leasing of the land for the purpose for which the land has been reserved,
with a similarly constrained power in the lessee to sub-lease only with the
consent of the Governor.
Section 33(4) provides a further alternative power in the Governor to direct
that land be granted in fee simple to a person subject to a condition that the
grantee shall not lease or mortgage the land without the consent of the
Governor and subject to such other conditions and limitations as the
Governor shall deem necessary to ensure that the land is used for the
purpose for which it is reserved. The fact that the legislature has provided
in three separate subsections for the vesting of land, the leasing of land and
the granting of land in fee simple is suggestive of the conclusion that the
legislature did not regard the vesting of land to be of the same effect as a
grant in fee simple. If the s 33(2) vesting amounted to a grant in fee
simple, then s 33(4) would be superfluous as all the powers would be
covered in s 33(2).
The majority judgment in Ward also did not take account of the degree of
'precariousness' which attaches to a vested reserve:
(a) which was classified as a B class reserve, which remains 'reserved
from alienation or from otherwise being dealt with unless and until the
Governor cancels such reservation by notice in the Gazette'P' or
(b) which was classified as B or C class reserve and where the Governor
was empowered to cancel the reservation, change the boundaries of or
amend the purpose of the reserve, upon publishing notice of the same in
the Gazette. 165
'B The Land Administration Act
Under the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA),'66 which repealed the
Land Act 1933 (WA), an order under s 33 of the repealed Act subsists as if
it were a management order under the new Act.'67. No distinction is drawn
under the new Act between an order resulting in a vesting, a lease or a
grant in fee simple pursuant to s 33 of the repealed Act. The contrast which
the majority judgment!" draws between the vesting of reserve land to be
held in trust, pursuant to s 33, and the placing of a reserve 'under control
'64 Land Act 1933, s 31(2).
165Land Act 1933, s 37.
I6'The Court did not refer to theLand Administration Act 1997 in its reasons.
167 Land Administration Act 1997, sched 2, clause 16(1).
168Ward [2002] HCA 28, [239].
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of any municipality, road board, body corporate, or persons as a board of
management' is eliminated under the new Act. It suggests that the
legislature never intended the distinction between (1) a vesting on trust and
(2) a placing 'under control' of a person or body of a piece of land to have
different legal effects.
The responsible Minister, under the new Act, has power to revoke the
management order where the management body agrees, or does not
comply with its management order or with its management plan or does
not submit a management plan when requested by the Minister'" or where
the Minister considers that it is in the public interest.!" Where the
management order is revoked because the Minister considers it is in the
public interest, the management body may claim compensation for any
improvement on the reserve made in accordance with the management
order. Any other ground for revocation would appear not to attract any
right of compensation. A management order is beset by a significant
degree of 'precariousness' and the holder of a management order is a mere
agent of the Crown, managing land for the Crown for a particular purpose.
The management body does not hold a legal title equi valent to a fee simple
grant.
C The Conservation and Land Management Act
In the case of national parks, the Conservation and LandManagement Act
1984 (hereinafter 'CALM Act') provides that land vested in the Authority
under the Land Act 1933 17 1 or a national park under the CALM Act J72 or
under the National Parks Authority Act 1976, ss 17(1) or 18173 is
declared'" to be vested in the Authority only for the purposes set out in
several subparagraphs of s 22(1)175 Those provisions deal with developing
policies, considering alterations to the vesting, management plans,
monitoring management, providing advice and causing research to be
undertaken for the purposes of policy development. The intention to be
gleaned from the provisions of the CALM Act applicable to the vesting of a
national park is that it is not intended to vest legal title by exclusive
possession in the National Parks and Conservation Authority. Exclusive
169 Pursuant to the Land Administration Act 1997, s 49(2).
170 Section 50(1) and (2).
171 Conservation and Land Management Act (hereinafter 'CALM Act') s 5(g).
172 CALM Act s 5(c).
173 CALM Act s 7(3).
174CALM Act ss 22(3), (2) and 7(2).
175 CALM Act s 22(1) (b), (c), (d), (e), (h), (i).
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possession by the Authority would be inconsistent with the capacity to
exercise some native title rights and interests in national parks.
D The Racial Discrimination Act and Category D
Past Act
It is also arguable that the vesting of a reserve in the Crown or a statutory
authority of the Crown after the passage of the Racial Discrimination Act
('RDA') is a category 0 past act and does not extinguish native title.
The majority in Ward held that a Crown to Crown grant in the form of a
lease to the Conservation Land Corporation of the Northern Territory was
not a Category B past act because it fell within the exception to the
definition of Category B past act in s 230(d)(i). It is, therefore, a category
D past act. A Crown to Crown grant for a national park or the preservation
of the natural environment is not a previous exclusive possession act. The'
non-extinguishment principle applied. Why this was so could not be
determined on the findings of fact. 176
The Court, on the other hand, held that the vesting of lands in reserves for
particular purposes under s 33 of the Land Act 1933 (WA), in a Minister of
the Crown, a statutory authority or a local authority, was not a 'past act',
because the vesting was not rendered invalid by the RDA. The majority
judgment concluded that s 10 of the RDA merely provided a right of
compensation.!". This conclusion places no weight upon the fact that if
any form of title, other than that held by the racial group which holds
native title in Western Australia, existed in relation to the land, no act of
vesting the land under s 33 of the Land Act 1933 could occur. No other
form of title could be extinguished by an act of vesting pursuant to section
33. No question of compensation would arise as a consequence of a
vesting in relation to any other form of property. If section IO( I) of the
RDA is truly to have the effect of giving native title holders 'security in the
enjoyment of their property "to the same extent" as persons generally
have security in the enjoyment of their property '.''' then the statutory
provision could not be held to be validly capable of authorising a vesting
which had the result of extinguishing native title. A law which thus
purports to authorise expropriation of property held by native title holders,
when it would not operate to expropriate any other property interest, would
be inconsistent with s 10(1) of the RDA and thus invalid to that extent, by
176 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [448]-[450).
171 Ibid [253], [108].
178 Ibid [113] (majority judgment); cf Mabo (No 1) (1988) 166CLR 186, 218-19,
230-1.
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operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. 179 If that is so, then,
contrary to the conclusion of the majority judgment, a vesting under s 33
of the Land Act 1933 would be a 'past act' under the NTA. It would not be
a 'category A past act', either, because it does not fit within any category
in the definition of that term or because it is a Crown to Crown grant (if it
is inferred to be a grant of a freehold estate) within the terms of s
229(2)(b)(i) of the NTA. It would be a 'category D past act', to which the
'non-extinguishment principle' would apply."o,
In the case of the creation of a nature reserve and its vesting in a person or
body corporate pursuant to the Land Act 1933 and the Conservation and
Land Management Act 1984, no reserve can be created or vested in
relation to land which is the subject of a property interest of any person
other than a native title holder. If it is desired to create and vest a reserve in
relation to land which is the subject of any other property interest, then the
land must first be resumed or acquired by the Crown, in accordance with
statutory processes which provide for the giving of notice and payment of
compensation to the property holder. The creation of a nature reserve over
land which is the subject of native title rights and interests, without any
notice to the native title holder or compensation for the acquisition of the
same would be tantamount to an arbitrary expropriation and deprivation of
property. The statutory provisions which authorise that process are, to that
extent, inconsistent with the RDA and consequently invalid as a result of
the operation of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution, in relation to
acts pursuant to that statutory authority which have occurred since the
enactment of the RDA.
The grant of any leases, licences, permits or authorities over land or
creation of any management plan pursuant to its status as a nature reserve
which interferes with the exercise of any native title right which existed
prior to the creation or vesting of a nature reserve since 31 October 1975
would also be invalid by virtue of the RDA and s 109 of the
Commonwealth Constitution.
The acts authorised by the CALM Act 1984 and Land Act 1933 which
occurred between 31 October 1975 and I January 1994 are 'past acts'
within the definition of s 228 of the NTA. Such acts are validated by the
State Validation Act (cf sections 15 and 19 of the NTA). An act of creation
of a reserve is a category D past act and so subject to the non-
extinguishment principle in s 238 of the NTA ; its effect is to suspend the
exercise of any native title rights inconsistent with such statutory rights.
This is because the body in whom the reserve is vested may have to
179 See Ward majority judgment, [2002) HCA 28, [113), referring to WA v
Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR373,437 ('NativeTitleActCase').
180 SeeNTA ss 232, J5(d)and 238.
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control access to or activities on the reserve during the currency of the
existence of the reserve. Any further act of vesting a reserve in a person or
body corporate (even if it had the effect of 'vesting' or 'passing' of 'a legal
estate in fee simple'!" is not 'the grant of a freehold estate' within the
terms of s 229 of the NTA. Therefore, it is not a category A past act.
Alternatively, where it is a grant by the Crown to the Crown in any
capacity, it is not a category A past act because of the effect of s
229(3)(d)(i) of the NTA. If it is not a category A past act, then it is a
category D past act and the non-extinguishment principle applies. Any
lease of any portion of a nature reserve would be a category B past act,
which would extinguish native title rights to the extent of any
inconsistency with the rights in the lease. Any licence, permit, authority or
management plan, however, would be a category D past act and subject to
the non-extinguishment principle.
IX RESUMPTION AND THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ACT
The High Court in Ward l 82 confirmed the view of the Full Federal Court'P
that a notice of resumption pursuant to the Public Works Act 1902
directing that land be vested in the Crown for an estate in fee simple, freed
from all other interests, extinguished native title. The High Court held"
that the Public Works Act s 18 provided no different treatment of native
title rights and interests from the treatment of other rights and interests in
the land and no inconsistency between s 18 of the Public Works Act and
the RDA arises.
The High Court in Ward also confirmed the conclusion of the Full Federal
Court that the resumption of land for a public purpose does not extinguish
native title. 185 The Court said that a resumption of land by the Crown, per
se, vests in the Crown title no larger than the 'radical title' it acquired at
sovereignty. It does not give any right or title to the land.!" If the
resumption is completed by an acquisition notice which in its terms goes
further in declaring that the land resumed is vested in the Crown 'for an
estate in fee simple in possession', or otherwise makes clear that 'the
interest that was to be created by the resumption was an estate in fee
181 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [240J-[241].
18'lbid [203]-[204], [280].
18' WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [432].
184 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [278].
18' Ibid [208].
18' Ibid.
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simple' 187 then that is an act which, subject to the effect of the RDA, would
extinguish native title.
The High Court!" differed from the Full Federal Court" in expressing the
view that 'looking to the use that has actually been made of land distracts
from the central inquiry which is an inquiry about rights created in others
or asserted by the executive, not the way in which they have been
exercised at any time' .'90
The High Court in Ward found that a resumption under s 18 of the Public
Works Act 1902
provided no different treatment of native title rights and interests from the
treatment of other rights and interests in land and it is not suggested that the
practical operation of that Act resulted in the different treatmentof native title
rights and non-native title rights. That being so, no question of inconsistency
between s 18of the Public Works Act and the RDA arises.'"
The High Court noted that the notice and compensation provisions were in
general terms. The majority judgment was to the effect that, if the notice
provisions did not apply to native title holders (because, arguably, they do
not fit within the definition of 'owners' or 'occupiers' of land in s l7(2)(c)
of the Public Works Act), then s JO( 1) of the RDA would take effect.!"
A Resumption, Vesting and the Racial
Discrimination Act
The resumption of land by the Crown, if valid, has no extinguishing effect
on native title. It does not give the Crown any larger title to the land than
the radical title acquired at sovereignty. "3 If native title is not affected by a
resumption, then the RDA is not triggered. However, any subsequent act to
the resumption, such as a vesting, is an act which could not be done if any
title except a native title existed over the area. It is, therefore an act which
deprives native title holders of a property right in circumstances where no
other property holder is deprived of the enjoyment of any right. It is,
consequently, an act, pursuant to State law which is inconsistent with s JO
187 Ibid [205J.
188 Ibid [234J.
189 WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, [419].
190 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [234).
191 Ibid [278].
192 Ibid [279].
"3 Ibid [208].
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of the RDA and invalid, as a consequence of the operation of s 109 of the
Commonwealth Constitution. I"
B Use of Reserve
The use of a reserve does not effect extinguishment of native title.!" Use
of a reserve, by itself, cannot amount to an effective assertion of beneficial
ownership of a reserve. As the High Court said,
The designation of land as a reserve for certain purposes did not without
more, create any right in the public or any section of the public which, by
reason of inconsistency and apart from the State Validation Act, extinguished
native titlerights and interests.!"
It is only when a 'public work' is constructed or established on a reserve,
by authority of power conferred by the Public Works Act, pursuant to the,
purpose for which it was created, that any further extinguishment of native
title occurs in relation to the land or waters on which the public work is
constructed, established or situated and adjacent land or waters the use of
which is necessary for, or incidental to, the construction, establishment or
operation of the work (and does not necessarily comprise the whole of the
area of the reserve) .197:
C The Racial Discrimination Act & the WA Mining
Act
The provisions of the Mining Act 1904 (WA) and the Petroleum Act 1936
(WA) have been held by the High Court in Ward l 98 to vest minerals and
petroleum in the Crown. However, the Court came to that conclusion
without considering the effect of s 9(2) of the Mining Act 1978 (WA). That
section provides that:
Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any previous enactment the owner,
grantee, lessee or licensee of, or other person entitled to, any land to which
this section or any corresponding provisions apply, that is not the subjectof a
mining tenement, is entitled to use any mineral existing in a natural state on or
below the surface of the land for any agricultural, pastoral, household, road
making, or building purpose, on that land.
194 Ibid [108] (situation(iii)).
195 Ibid [215].
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid [223]; NTA s 25 !D.
I"[2002] HCA 28, [377]-[384].
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Native title holders are 'entitled to' the land in relation to which the native
title is found to exist. They are therefore entitled to use any' mineral,
including ochre (proclaimed to be a mineral on 12 May 1920) for the
purposes set out in s 9(2). The right to use a mineral for a 'household'
purpose is a right to use it for domestic or day-to-day living purposes.
Upon a broad reading of that concept, that would include use by members
of a community, with a community entitlement to the land, of ochre for
community purposes such as for ceremonial decoration, and would include
the gift, exchange or trade of ochre within the community or with
neighbouring communities for similar purposes, consistent with the
traditional laws and customary practices of the native title holding
community. If the ordinary meaning of the term could not be expanded to
such uses, then s 10 of the RDA would extend the enjoyment of that
property right, available to non-Aboriginal racial groups who primarily
hold rights and exercise property rights as 'households', to those
Aboriginal racial groups who hold and exercise property rights as a
community, thus allowing the use of minerals, including ochre, for
communal purposes.
The High Court in Ward held that it cannot be said that mining leases are
necessarily inconsistent with the continued existence of native title rights
and interests; however, some native title rights and interests would
necessarily be extinguished in relation to some areas of a mining lease."?
Their Honours noted that the native title right to control access to the land
is inconsistent with and extinguished by the right of access arising under a
mining lease.2(JO
The High Court in Ward observed that the majority of the Full Federal
Court in Ward held,ol that any native title right or interest to hunt or gather
over land in a nature reserve created before 1975 was extinguished and
special leave to challenge that finding was refused.P' The holding of the
Full Federal Court in Ward, however, was that where nature reserves or
wildlife sanctuaries have been created after the RDA came into force, s 211
of the NTA would, by force of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution,
override the provisions of s 23 of the Wildlife Conservation Act 1950
(WA), and the native title right to take fauna would not be wholly
extinguished. They concluded that the RDA would apply because the
creation of the nature reserves and wildlife sanctuaries had had a much
greater impact on native title holders in the area concerned than on other
Australians, who at most held common law rights to hunt game.
199 Ibid [296].
200 Ibid [309].
201 WA v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 446 [504].
202 Ward [2oo2J HCA 28, [246J.
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The Full Federal Court in Ward held that ss 104--106 of the Conservation
and Land Management Act 1984 (WA) and regulations under the Wildlife
Conservation Act 1950 (WA), while imposing 'very stringent and
extensive control over human activities within nature reserves and wildlife
sanctuaries', do not prevent the continued enjoyment of all native title
rights and interests in relation to the land within them; however, the
provisions do extinguish an 'exclusive native title right to control access'
and an 'exclusive right of possession and occupancy' .203
The High Court in Ward indicated that the RDA has an impact in relation
to a nature reserve created after 31 October 1975.204 Their Honours also
indicated that native title rights and interests are 'property' and are
protected by the RDA as 'the human right to own and inherit property
(including the right to be immune from arbitrary deprivation of
property), .205
In Ward'06 reference was made by the High Court to the Native Title Act
Case 20? for the propositions that, where security of enjoyment of property
is more limited for the persons of a particular race than it is for others,
s 10(1) of the NTA gives that security to the same extent enjoyed by others
and carries immunity from arbitrary deprivation of that property. Quoting
from the Native Title Act case, their Honours confirmed that
If a law of a State provides that property held by members of the community
generally may not be expropriated except for prescribed purposes or on
prescribed conditions (including the payment of compensation), a State law
which purports to authoriseexpropriation of property held by the 'persons of
a particular race' for purposes additional to those generally justifying
expropriation or on less stringent conditions (including less compensation) is
inconsistent with s 10(1)of the [RDA].'08
As the High Court pointed out, 'the conclusion that the State law provided
for differential treatment of land holding according to race, colour or
national or ethnic origin was critical' in reaching a conclusion of direct
inconsistency between the State law and the RDA.209
In Ward the majority judgment of the High Court suggested:
203 WA v Ward (2000)99 FCR 316, [506]-[508]. See however the argument above
in relation to partial extinguishment of the rightto control access.
204 [2002] HCA28, [247].
205 Ibid [116], quoting Mabo (No 1) (1988) 166 CLR 186, 127 (Brennan, Toohey
and Gaudron JJ).
206 [2002] HCA28, [113].
207 WA v Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, 437.
208 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [113].
209 Ibid.
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it is at least arguable that the Act's requirement that notice be given to
'owners' and 'occupiers' ofland [Public Works Act, s 17(2)(c)] didnot extend
to native title holders. If that were the betterconstruction of the Act, although
we doubt that it is, s IO(I) of the RDA would, as a matter of federal law,
supplysucha right.?"
The conclusion reached in Ward was that s 18 of the Public Works Act,
which results in conversion of interests in land into a claim for
compensation upon publication of the notice of resumption under s 17(1),
was not inconsistent with the RDA. The resumption would thus not be
invalid, and would not be a 'past act', within the terms of the NTA. 2lJ
The High Court in Ward followed Mabo (No 1) and the Native Title Act
Case and held that native title cannot be treated differently from other
forms of title because its characteristics are different."! Their Honours
pointed out (following a dictum of Mason J in Gerhardy v Brown)213 that
where a State law extinguishes only native title, leaving other titles intact,
it is depriving a person of a particular race of a right and 'the
discriminatory burden of extinguishment is removed because the operation
of the State law is rendered invalid by s 109 of the Constitution'v'" The
High Court identifies the 'rights' to be compared as 'the human right to
own and inherit property (including a human right to be immune from
arbitrary deprivation of propertyj.i" In relation to mining leases the High
Court point out that if native title holders 'do not, under the WA Mining
Act, enjoy their rights and interests ... to the same extent as holders of
other forms of title, s 10 of the RDA is engaged?"
Under s 123 of the Mining Act 1978 (WA) the 'owner' and 'occupier' of
land the subject of mining operations are entitled to compensation for loss
or damage resulting from or arising from the mining. An inclusive
description of what may be compensated makes reference to matters
related to deprivation of possession or use of any part of the land."? The
Mining Act (WA) does not contemplate that the property of an 'owner' or
'occupier' is extinguished by the grant of a mining lease. Indeed, s 27
provides for the making of an application for a mining tenement in respect
210 Ibid [201].
211 Ibid [280].
212 Ibid [117]-[122].
213 (1985) 159CLR70, 98-9.
214 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [106]-[108].
215 Ibid [116].
216 Ibid [311].
217 Milling Act 1978 (WA) s 123(4).
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of 'private land'. 218 Further, the statutory compensation provisions provide
a remedy for a statutorily sanctioned trespass in relation to property
interests. Section 113 of the WA Mining Act further states: 'Where a
mining tenement expires or is surrendered or forfeited, the owner of the
land to which the mining tenement related may take possession of the land
forthwith .. .' .
The High Court held that native title holders are not 'owners' within the
definition of that term in the WA Mining Act where their right to control
access to the land had been extinguished by the prior grant of a pastoral
lease over the same area, and that the RDA was not violated by that
consequence because it would apply to any other property interest which
did not include the right to control access?"
The majority found it unnecessary to reach any conclusion as to whether
native title holders are 'occupiers', within the definition of that term in the
WA Mining Act,220 but concluded that if native title holders are 'occupiers;
then they are entitled to compensation under the WA Mining Act and the
RDA would not be engaged. Their Honours said:
Therefore, there would be no invalidity in respect of the mining leases, and to
the extent that the grant of those mining leases extinguished native title, that
native title would remain extinguished?"
It is arguable that the Court did not appear to consider the fact that the
consequence of extinguishment of native title is not a consequence which
applies to any other property interest by the grant of a mining tenement
and that the RDA would, therefore, be engaged to rectify the resulting
discrimination. Consistent with what the Court said at [108], if the grant of
a mining lease extinguishes native title to any extent, then 'the
discriminatory burden of extinguishment is removed because the operation
of the State law is rendered invalid by s 109 of the Constitution'.
The majority considered the alternative hypothesis that the holders of
native title cannot properly be described as 'occupiers', and concluded
that, in that circumstance, s 10 of the RDA is engaged.f" They concluded
that sID of the RDA would operate to confer the same right of
compensation on native title holders as would apply to 'occupiers'. They
point out
218 'Private Land' is defined in s 8 of the Mining Act 1978 (WA). The definition
includes an estate of freehold and any lease (not being a pastoral lease).
219 Ward [2002] HCA 28, [317].
220 Ibid [318].
221 Ibid [319].
222 Ibid [320].
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that when the RDA operates in this way, the validity of the mining leases is
unaffected, as is the extinguishingeffect that those grants may have on native
title. The grants did not, therefore, constitute category C past acts. The result
is that to the extent that the grants of the respective mining leases
extinguished native title, that native title is extinguished and in place thereof,
the holders of that native title have a statutory entitlement to compensation
223
It is arguable that this conclusion, while bringing native title into line with
'occupiers' in respect of compensation for trespass in relation to their
property interests, omits to apply the same remedy provided by the RDA of
removing 'the discriminatory burden of extinguishment' from the native
title holders which does not apply to other property interests.
Their Honours poignantly noted that since
no basis is suggested in the Convention or the RDA for distinguishing
between different types of property and inheritance rights, the RDA must be
taken to proceed on the basis that different characteristics attaching to the
ownership or inheritance of property by persons of a particular race are
irrelevant to the question whether the right of persons of that race to own or
inherit property is a right of the same kind as the right to own or inherit
property enjoyed by persons of another race.224
It is arguable, on the basis of that reasoning, that, during the period of
operation of the RDA, native title cannot be extinguished by the grant of a
mining lease if it does not have that effect in relation to other forms of
property ownership.
The availability to native title holders of a right of compensation
applicable to 'occupiers' of land under s 123 of the Mining Act 1978
(WA), in respect of what would otherwise be tortious acts of trespass and
damage to a property interest, does not make the depri vation of property
by permanent extinguishment of nati ve title any less arbitrary.
Section 10 of the RDA might come closer to providing security of
enjoyment of property to native title holders to the same extent as is
enjoyed by other property holders if it operated to confirm that native title
holders have the same right to resume exercise of their rights and interests
upon the expiration, surrender or forfeiture of a mining tenement as has
'the owner of land to which the mining tenement related' under s 113 of
the Mining Act 1978. That provision either declares the legal position
which would otherwise exist in relation to 'the owner of land' affected by
a mining tenement, or creates a statutory right which applies to property
owners generally pursuant to s 10 of the RDA.
223 Ibid [321].
224 Ibid [121].
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In the absence of such a statutory mechanism for eliminating the
discriminatory burden of extinguishment, the provision of the Mining Act
1978 authorising the grant of a mining tenement and extinguishing native
title would seem invalid because of its inconsistency with the RDA. The
statutory provision would be validated as a category D past act and any
mining lease granted pursuant to it would be validated as a category C past
act to the extent such act affected native title. The non-extinguishment
principle set out in s 238 of the NTA would apply to the statutory provision
and the grant.
In Ward, the majority judgment of the High Court suggested it was
at least arguable [see WA v Commonwealth. (1994-95) 183 CLR 373, 447]
that the Act's requirement that noticebe given to 'owners' and 'occupiers' of
land [Public Works Act, s 17(2)(c)] did not extend to native title holders. If
that were the better construction of the Act, although we doubt that it is,
s 10(1) of theRDA would, as a matter of federal law, supply such a right.'" ,
The conclusion reached was that s 18 of the Public Works Act, which
results in the conversion of interests in land into a claim for compensation
upon publication of the notice of resumption under s 17(1), was not
inconsistent with the RDA.226 The resumption would thus not be invalid,
and would not be a 'past act', within the terms of the NTA.
CONCLUSIONS
The High Court in Yarmirr declared that the common law was not limited
to the low water mark in recognising native title, but set a limit on
recognition of rights which would be inconsistent with international law
rights and general common law offshore rights. This paper puts the
argument that generally expressed exclusive native title rights of the type
claimed by the native title holders in Yarmirr may be inconsistent with
those international and common law rights; however, without being
inconsistent with international and common law rights, more precisely
expressed rights based upon traditional laws and customs may impact on
the behaviour of others in a limited way.
The High Court in Ward emphasised the importance of following the
words of the NTA in making an approved determination of native title,
rather than attempting to draw a definition of native title from the common
law cases. Native title was affirmed as comprising a bundle of rights, and a
detailed analysis was made of the inconsistency between certain native
title rights claimed and numerous forms of grant and statutory right. This
'" Ibid [201].
"6 Ibid [280].
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paper puts a view that there are number of areas where the analysis of the
High Court might be revisited, particularly in relation to issues of the
application of the RDA, the right to control access and the effect of vesting
ofa reserve.
The Yorta Yorta case has provided a contentious analysis of the
relationship between the common law and the source of the traditional
laws and customs upon which native title rights and interests are based. It
dwelt on the need to focus on norms, and the facts that laws emanated
from a body of people and that norms are subject to change. The case
discounted the need to present all the manifestations of a society of people
and focused on the normative system and its impact on the rights and
interests of groups in relation to land and waters.
The form of application for a determination of native title set out in the
schedule below attempts to encapsulate all that is required to be stated in
an application for a determination of native title following the recent
decisions of the High Court under review here, taking into account the
provisions of the NTA and the recent decision of Justice Lindgren in
Wongatha'" which deals with an application to amend an application for a
determination of native title.
Schedule
NATIVE TITLE DETERMINATION
CLAIMANT APPLICATION
(FORM 1)
Name of the Applicant:
Definitions
In this Application the following words shall have the following meanings
set out hereunder:
Application area means the area covered by this application as described
in Schedule B;
'" Harrington-Smith 011 behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No
5) [2003] FCA 218.
11 R GregMcIntyre 9JCULR Special Issue 12002l20Q3)
Area A means land within the application area that is landward of the high
water mark and which comprises:
(i) areas of unallocated Crown land (including islands) that have not been
previously subject to any grant by the Crown,
(ii) areas to which section 47 of the Native Tille Act 1993 applies,
(iii)areas to which section 47A of the Native Title Act 1993 applies,
(iv)areas to which section 47B of the Native Title Act 1993 applies; and
(v) other areas to which the non-extinguishment principle, set out in
section 238 of the Native Title Act, applies and in relation to which to
there has not been any prior extinguishment of native title.
Area B means land or waters within the application area that are not
within Area A and which comprise:
(i) land and waters which are subject to a non-exclusive pastoral lease;
(ii) areas of Crown Land (including islands) that have been set aside as
Crown reserves, but are not vested in a person or body corporate to be
held in trust, or otherwise, for a specified purpose pursuant to section
33 of the Land Act 1933 (WA) other than those described in Area C;
(iii) land and waters which are subject to a mining lease as defined in s 245
of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth);
(iv)any area which, at the time of the application, is:
(a) not covered by a freehold estate or a lease, but
(b) covered by a reservation, proclamation, dedication, condition,
permission or authority, made or conferred by the Crown in any
capacity, or by the making, amendment or repeal of legislation of
the Commonwealth or a Territory, under which the whole or a part
of the land or waters in the area is to be used for a public purpose
or for a particular purpose; or
(c) subject to a resumption process (as defined in s 47B(5)(b) of the
Native Title Act); and
(v) any area which, at the time of the application, is:
(a) not covered by a freehold estate or a lease;
>
(b) not covered by a reservation, proclamation, dedication, condition,
permission or authority, made or conferred by the Crown in any
capacity, or by the making, amendment or repeal of legislation of
the Commonwealth or a Territory, under which the whole or a part
of the land or waters in the area is to be used for a public purpose
or for a particular purpose;
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(c) not subject to a resumption process (as defined in s 47B(5)(b) of
the Native Title Act); and
(d) no member of the native title claim group occupies the area when
this application is made.
Area C means land and waters within the application area which are not
within Area A and which comprise land and waters which are a 'nature
reserve' or 'wildlife sanctuary' (as those terms are defined in the Wildlife
Conservation Act 1950 (WA» created before 31 October 1975.
Significant means having social, cultural, religious, spiritual, ceremonial,
ritual or cosmological importance or significance to the common law
native title holders connected to the area under traditional laws, customs
and practices of the Aboriginal society to which they belong.
All words used in this application which are defined in the Native Title Act
1993 (Cth) bear the same meaning as in that Act, or the meaning in the
Native Title (Effect of Past Acts) Act 1995 (WA), where that meaning
differs from the meaning in the NTA, unless the context dictates otherwise.
A. Details of the claim
1. The Applicant applies for a determination of native title under
subsection 61(1) of the Native Title Act 1993.
2. The Applicant is entitled to make this application as the people named
as the Applicant are authorised by the native title claim group to make
the native title determination application and deal with all matters
arising under the NTA in relation to the Application.
3. The schedules to this application contain the following information:
Schedule A [see Act, s 61]
The claim is brought on behalf of the people listed in Attachment
~A'.
Schedule B [see Act, s 62]
The external boundaries of the area of land and waters covered by the
application are as set out in the map attached and are set out in the
document entitled 'Description of External Boundary' which is annexed as
Attachment 'B'.
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Areas of land and waters within those boundaries that are not covered by
the application
(I) Subject to (4), the Applicant excludes from the area of land and waters
covered by the application any areas that are covered by any of the
following acts as these are defined in either the Native Title Act 1993
(Cth), as amended (where the act in question is attributable to the
Commonwealth), or Titles (Validation) and Native Title (Effect ofPast
Acts) Act 1995 (WA), as amended, (where the act in question is
attributable to the State of Western Australia) at the time of the
Registrar's consideration:
• Category A past acts
• Category A intermediate period acts
• Category B past acts that are wholly inconsistent with the
continued existence, enjoyment or exercise of any native title
rights or interests
• Category B intermediate period acts that are wholly inconsistent
with the continued existence, enjoyment or exercise of any native
title rights or interests.
(2) Subject to (4), the Applicant excludes from the area of land and waters
covered by the application any areas in relation to which:
• a 'previous exclusive possession act', as defined in section 23B of
the NTA, was done and the act was an act attributable to the
Commonwealth; or
• a 'relevant act' as that term is defined in section 121 of the Titles
(Validation) and Native Title (Effect of Past Acts) Act 1995 (WA)
was done and the act is attributable to the State of Western
Australia; or
• a 'previous exclusive possession act' under section 23B(7) of the
NTA was done in relation to the area and the act was attributable
to the State of Western Australia.
(3) Subject to (4), the Applicant also excludes from the area of land and
waters covered by the application areas in relation to which native title
rights and interests have otherwise been wholly extinguished.
>
• The area of land and waters covered by the application includes any
area in relation to which the non-extinguishment principle (as defined
in section 238 of the Native Title Act 1993) applies, including any area
to which sections 47, 47A and 47B of the NTA apply, particulars of
which will be provided prior to the hearing but which include such
areas as may be listed in Schedule L.
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• Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this application
(including the attachments to it), the Applicant excludes from the area
of land and waters covered by the application those areas of land and
waters that were excluded from the area of land and waters included in
the original application in WAG 6096 of 1998, as at 4 June 1996. 228
Schedule C [see Act, s 62)
A map showing the boundaries of the area covered by the application is
annexed as Attachment 'C'.
Schedule D [see Act, s 62)
The Applicant does not have details of any searches that have been carried
out to determine the existence of any non-native title rights and interests in
relation to the land or waters in the area covered by the application.
Schedule E [see Act, s 62)
Subject to laws and customs
The native title rights and interests claimed in this application are subject
to and exercisable in accordance with:
1. the common law, the laws of the State of Western Australia and the
Commonwealth of Australia; and
2. valid interests conferred under those laws, and
3. the body of traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal society
under which rights and interests are possessed and by which native
title claim group have a connection to the area of land and waters the
subject of this application.
Area A rights
The native title rights and interests in relation to Area A comprise:
(I) The right to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the area as against the
world;
(2) A right to occupy the area;
(3) A right to use the area;
228 Paragraphs (1) to (5) adopt suggestions fordrafting set out in the reasons forjudgment
of Lindgren J in wongatha, at [121-[17] • [28].
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(4) A right to enjoy the area;
(5) A right to be present on or within the area;
(6) A right to be present on or within the area in connection with the
society's economic life;
(7) A right to be present on or within the area in connection with the
society's religious life;
(8) A right to be present on or within the area in connection with the
society's cultural life;
(9) A right to hunt in the area;
(10) A right to fish in the area;
(11) A right to make decisions about the use of the area by members of the
Aboriginal society to which the native title claim group belong;
(12) A right to make decisions about the use of the area by persons who
are not members of the Aboriginal society to which the native title
claim group belong;
(13) A right to make decisions about the enjoyment of the area by persons
who are members of the Aboriginal society to which the native title
claim group belong by persons who are members of the Aboriginal
society to which the native title claim group belong;
(14) A right to make decisions about the enjoyment of the area by
members of the Aboriginal society to which the native title claim
group belong by persons who are not members of the Aboriginal
society to which the native title claim group belong;
(15) A right Of access to the area;
(16) A right to live within the area;
(17) A right to reside in the area;
(18) A right to erect shelters upon or within the area;
(19) A right to camp upon or within the area;
(20) A right to move about the area;
(21) A right to engage in cultural activities within the area;
>
(22) A right to conduct ceremonies within the area;
(23) A right to participate in ceremonies within the area;
(24) A right to hold meetings within the area,
(25) A right to participate in meetings within the area,
(26) A right to teach as to the physical attributes of the area;
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(27) A right to teach as to the significant attributes of the area;
(28) A right to teach upon the area as to the significant attributes of the
area;
(29) A right to teach as to the significant attributes within the area of the
Aboriginal society connected to the area in accordance with its laws
and customs;
(30) A right to control access of others to the area;
(31) A right to control access of others to the area except such person as
may be exercising a right accorded by the common law, statute law of
the Commonwealth or the State of Western Australia or a lawful
grant by the British sovereign or its successor;
(32) A right to take resources, other than minerals and petroleum, used for
sustenance from the area;
(33) A right to take resources, other than minerals and petroleum, used for
sustenance within the area;
(34) A right to gather resources, other than minerals and petroleum, used
for sustenance within the area;
(35) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for sustenance within the area;
(36) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for food, on, in, under or within the area;
(37) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for shelter, on, in or within the area;
(38) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for healing, on, in or within the area;
(39) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for decoration, on, in or within the area;
(40) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for social purposes, on, in or within the area;
(41) A right to use and/or enjoy resources, other than minerals and
petroleum, for cultural, religious, spiritual, ceremonial and/or ritual
purposes, on, in or within the area;
(42) A right to take fauna;
(43) A right to take flora (including timber);
(44) A right to take soil;
(45) A right to take sand;
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(46) A right to take stone'" and/or flint;
(47) A right to take clay;
(48) A right to take gravel;
(49) A right to take ochre230;
(50) A right to take water;
(51) A right to control the taking, use and enjoyment by others of the
resources of the area, including for the said purposes (set out at sub-
paragraphs (32)-(41) above) and/or in the said form (set out at sub-
paragraphs (42)-(50) above), other than minerals and petroleum and
any resource taken in exercise of a statutory right or common law
right, including the public right to fish;
(52) A right to manufacture from and trade in the said resources of the
area, upon or within the area, other than minerals and petroleum;
including the manufacture of objects, materials or goods for
sustenance, and/or food, shelter, healing, decoration, social, cultural,
religious, spiritual, ceremonial and/or ritual purposes and/or including
objects, materials or goods in the form of tools, weapons, clothing,
shelter and/or decoration;
(53) A right to receive a portion of the said resources (other than minerals
and petroleum) taken by other persons who are members of the
Aboriginal society from the area;
(54) A right to receive a portion of the said resources (other than minerals
and petroleum) taken by other persons other than those who are
members of the Aboriginal society from the area;
(55) A right, in relation to any activity occurring on the area, to
(i) maintain
(ii) conserve and/or
(iii) protect
significant places and objects located within the area, by preventing,
by all reasonable lawful means, any activity which may injure,
desecrate, damage, destroy, alter or misuse any such place or object;
(56) A right, in relation to any activity occurring on the area, to
229 'Ochre' has been proclaimed as a 'mineral' pursuant to the Mining ACI /904 (WA). An
issuemay ariseas to whether all thecolouring used forceremonial decoration comes from a
mineral form. Sometimes colouring is taken from plants.
230 Stone" is not mentioned in the definition of "minerals" in the Mining Act 1978 (WA);
probably because it is a wholeform, which is notusually what is extracted by mining.
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(i) maintain
(ii) conserve and/or
(iii) protect
significant ceremonies, artworks, song cycles, narratives, beliefs or
practices by preventing, by all reasonable lawful means any activity
occurring on the area which may injure, desecrate, damage, destroy,
alter or misuse any such ceremony, artwork, song cycle, narrative,
belief or practice;
(57) A right, in relation to a use of the area or an activity within the area,
to:
(i) prevent any use or activity which is unauthorised in accordance
with traditional laws and customs
(ii) prevent any use or activity which is inappropriate in accordance
with traditional laws and customs
in relation to significant places and objects within the area or
ceremonies, artworks, song cycles, narratives, beliefs or practices
carried out within the area by all reasonable lawful means, including
by the native title holders providing all relevant persons by all
reasonable means with information as to such uses and activities,
provided that such persons are able to comply with the requirements
of those traditional laws and customs while engaging in reasonable
use of the area and are not thereby prevented from exercising any
statutory or common law rights to which that person may be entitled
(58) A right to enjoy all the features, benefits and advantages inherent in
the environment of the area;
(59) A right of individual members of the native title holding group or
groups to be identified and acknowledged, in accordance with the
traditional laws adhered to and traditional customs observed by the
group or groups, as the holders of native title rights in relation to the
land and waters of the area; and
(60) A right of the group or groups who hold common or group native title
rights and interests to identify and acknowledge individual members
of the native title holding group, in accordance with the traditional
laws adhered to and traditional customs observed by the group or
groups, as the holders of native title rights in relation to the land and
waters of the area.
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Area Brights
The native title rights and interests which are claimed in relation to Area B
are all the rights claimed above in relation to Area A, except the right to
possess, occupy, use and enjoy the area as against the world and the rights
set out in paragraphs (12), (14), (30), (31) and (51).
Area C rights
The native title rights and interests which are claimed in relation to Area C
are all the rights claimed above in relation to Area A, except the right to
possess, occupy, use and enjoy the area as against the world and the rights
set out in paragraphs (12), (14), (30), (31) and (51) and the right to hunt,
gather or take fauna, in so far as such right is contained within paragraphs
(3), (4), (9), (10), (21), (32)-(42), (52) and (53).
Schedule F [see Act, s 62]
The native title rights and interests claimed exist on the following factual
basis:
1. the native title group have an association with the area based on
traditional laws which they acknowledge and traditional customs
which they observe;
2. the predecessors of the native title claim group had an association
with the area from a time prior to the assertion of British sovereignty
in relation to the area;
3. the native title rights and interests are possessed under a body of
traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed by
the native title claim group and their predecessors; and
4. the native title claim group have continued to hold the native title in
accordance with those traditional laws and customs, including laws
and customs which vest land and waters in the native title claim
group on the basis of:
a. descent from ancestors connected with the area;
b. conception in the area;,
c. birth in the area;
d. traditional religious knowledge of the area;
e. traditional knowledge of the creation and geography of the area;
f. traditional knowledge of the resources of the area;
- ._._--------------------------------------------,
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g. knowledge of and participation in traditional
rituals associated with the area.
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ceremonies and
Schedule G [see Act, s 62]
The members of the native title claim group currently carry out the
following activities in relation to the land and waters:
I. hunting, gathering and fishing;
2. moving about, living, residing, erecting shelters and camping;
3. conducting and engaging in cultural activities, ceremonies, rituals,
meetings and teaching of, maintaining, conserving and protecting the
significant and physical attributes of the area and places, works and
objects within the area;
4. taking resources from the area, including fauna, flora, soil, sand, stone,
flint, clay, gravel, ochre, water for use and consumption for food,
shelter, healing, decoration, cultural, religious, ceremonial and ritual
purposes and for manufacture and trade of objects, materials and
goods, in the form of tools, weapons, clothing, shelter and decoration.
Schedule H [see Act, s 62]
The other applications to the High Court, Federal Court or recognised
Statefferritory body that have been made in relation to the whole or a part
of any area covered by this application and that seek a determination of
native title or compensation in relation to native title are:
Schedule I [see Act, s 62]
Details of any notices under section 29 of the Act, of which the Applicant
is aware, that have been given and that relate to the whole or a part of the
area are annexed as Attachment 'I' .
Schedule J
The applications are not unopposed.
Schedule K
The representative Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander body for the area
covered by the application is the .... Aboriginal Corporation.
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ScheduleL [see Act, ss 47, 47A, 47B and 61A]
The Applicant does not have details of:
(a) any area for which a pastoral lease is held by or on behalf of the
members of the native title claim group; and
(b) any area leased, held or reserved for the benefit of Aboriginal peoples
or Torres Strait Islanders and occupied by or on behalf of the members of
the native title claim group; and
(c) any vacant crown land occupied by the members of the native title
claim group; and
(d) any area mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) over which the
extinguishment of native title is required by section 47, 47A or 47B of the
Act to be disregarded.
Schedule R [see Act, s 190C - optional]
This application has been certified under s 203BE of the Native Title Act
by the Aboriginal Corporation.
Schedule S
Details of the differences between the Application and the Application as
amended:
1. Name of the Applicant
An amendment has been made to this schedule to remove the name
' ....... .' from 'the name of the Applicant.?"
Amendments have also been made to this schedule to remove references to
the term 'Applicants' and replace them with the term 'the Applicant' (see s
61(2)) and to add the words 'and deal with all matters arising under the
NTA in relation to the Application' at the end of paragraph 2.
2. Schedule A
An amendment has been made to this schedule to remove the name
,232
3. Schedule B '
An amendment has been made to Attachment 'B' 'Description of External
Claim Boundary' to reflect that the eastern external boundaries of the
231 Jfany suchchangehas been made.
232 If any such change has been made.
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claim have been pulled back to remove an overlap with [Number and name
of applicationj.i".
An amendment has also been made to the description of the internal
boundaries in accordance with the High Court's decision in Western
Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR I.
Amendments have also been made to this schedule to remove references to
the term'Applicants' and replace them with the term 'the Applicant.'
4. Schedule C
An amendment has been made to Attachment 'C', a map showing the
boundaries of the area covered by the application, to reflect that the eastern
external boundaries of the claim have been pulled back to remove an
overlap with [Number and name of applicationj.i"
5. Schedule D
Amendments have been made to this schedule to remove references to the
term'Applicants' and replace them with the term 'the Applicant.'
6. Schedule E
An amendment has also been made to rights and interests claimed in
accordance with the High Court's decision in Western Australia v Ward
(2002) 191 ALR I.
7. Schedule F
An amendment has been made to the general description of the factual
basis on which it is asserted that the native title rights and interests claimed
exist in accordance with the High Court's decision in Western AustraLia v
Ward (2002) 191 ALR I.
8. Schedule G
An amendment has been made to the description of the activities which the
native title claim group currently carry on in relation to the land and waters
to better reflect the High Court's decision in Western Australia v Ward
(2002) 191 ALR I.
9. Schedule H
No change.
10. Schedule I
An amendment has been made to this schedule to bring it up to date.
233 If any such change hasbeen made.
234 If any such chang hasbeen made.
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Amendments have also been made to this schedule to remove references to
the term 'Applicants' and replace them with the term 'the Applicant.'
II. Schedule J
No change.
12. Schedule K
An amendment has been made to this schedule to delete the words
' .' and replace them with the words ' Aboriginal
Corporation' .'"
13. Schedule L
An amendment has been made to this schedule to correct a typographical
error and also to remove references to the term 'Applicants' and replace it
with the term 'the Applicant.'
14. Schedule R
An amendment has been made to this schedule to reflect amendments
made to the Native Title Act 1993. The words 'Yamatji Land and Sea
Council' are replaced with the words 'Yamatji Marlpa Barna Baaba Maaja
Aboriginal Corporation' .
An amendment has been made to this schedule to reflect amendments
made to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
235If any change hasbeen made to theNTRB forthearea.
